【文章】Helen Pluckrose - Make Bullshit Embarrassing Again: Toward Enlightenment 2.0
連結
原文及個人翻譯
A Tragedy That Tests the Freedom To be Wrong / 一場考驗「錯誤」自由的悲劇
Paloma Shemirani, the 23-year-old daughter of conspiracy theorist, Kate Shemirani, died after declining medical treatment for a cancer doctors believed she had 80% chance of surviving. Recently, Coroner Catherine Wood ruled that Paloma’s mother had influenced her to reject chemotherapy in favour of juices and coffee enemas which ultimately led to her death. Wood called Mrs. Shemirani’s care of her daughter “incomprehensible but not unlawful killing.” Paloma’s brothers, Gabriel and Sebastian, have responded angrily, testifying that their mother was entirely to blame for their sister’s death. The brothers had been so concerned for their sister that Gabriel had started a legal case to try to force an assessment of her treatment options. .
The brothers’ fight for their sister is over, but they remain dedicated to raising awareness of the risks to the children, including adult children, of conspiracy theorists. Sebastian said,” My sister has passed away as a direct consequence of my mum’s actions and beliefs, and I don’t want anyone else to go through the same pain or loss that I have.” For Gabriel, education is key. He describes having grown up being taught bizarre beliefs including that 9/11 was an inside job and the royal family are shape-shifting lizards as true. He came to question these when he entered secondary school and such claims were challenged.
帕洛瑪·謝米拉尼，這位23歲的陰謀論者凱特·謝米拉尼的女兒，在拒絕接受醫生認為她有80%生存機會的癌癥治療後去世。 近日，驗屍官凱瑟琳·伍德裁定，帕洛瑪的母親影響了她拒絕化療，而選擇果汁和咖啡灌腸，最終導致她的死亡。 伍德稱謝米拉尼女士對女兒的照顧「令人難以理解，但並非非法殺害」。 帕洛瑪的兄弟加布里埃爾和塞巴斯蒂安對此表示憤怒，他們作證說，他們的母親完全應該為妹妹的去世負責。 這兩位兄弟一直非常擔心他們的妹妹，以至於加布里埃爾曾啟動了一項法律訴訟，試圖強制評估她治療方案的選擇。
兄弟們為他們的妹妹而奮鬥已經結束，但他們仍然致力於提高人們對陰謀論者及其子女（包括成年子女）面臨的風險的認識。 塞巴斯蒂安說：「我的妹妹是由於我母親的行為和信仰而去世的，我不希望任何人經歷和我一樣的痛苦或失去。」 對於加布里埃爾來說，教育至關重要。 他描述了自己從小就被灌輸一些奇怪的信念，包括9/11是由內部人員製造的，以及王室成員是變身蜥蜴。 當他進入中學後，這些說法受到了質疑，他開始對這些提出疑問。
This deeply distressing case speaks to a consistent concern for liberals who care about both truth and freedom. These two values can come into conflict. Central to liberalism is protecting the freedom to be wrong. This is essential both as an individual liberty and as a practical safeguard against giving any dominant orthodoxy the power to define truth for everybody. Academic freedom, scientific discovery and the freedom of everyday people to discuss and debate even controversial and seemingly outlandish ideas depend upon our willingness to defend the freedom to be wrong. Paradoxically, this protects our ability to obtain truth. When it is those in power who are wrong but insisting that it is people dissenting for good reason who are spreading misinformation, protecting the freedom to be wrong enables those who are actually right to convince others of this and facilitate correction.
Yet allowing people to be wrong can have harmful, even fatal, consequences. The coroner was right, I think, to hold Mrs. Shemirani morally but not legally responsible for the influence she exerted over her adult daughter. Paloma’s death was tragic and unnecessary. She appears to have been psychologically vulnerable and easily influenced by her mother. Nevertheless, she was an adult with mental capacity to make her own decisions, and beyond ensuring she was fully informed, little more could ethically have been done in the way of intervention. Her brothers’ anger is understandable and the direct line they draw between their mother’s beliefs and their sister’s death seems undeniable. Yet, the standards to determine that someone lacks the mental capacity to make their own health decisions have to remain very high.
這個令人深感悲痛的案例反映了自由主義者對真理和自由這兩個價值觀的持續關注。 這兩個價值觀可能會發生衝突。 自由主義的核心是保護「有權犯錯的自由」。 這是作為一種個人自由以及一種實際保障，防止任何占主導地位的正統觀念擁有為所有人定義真相的權力所必需的。 學術自由、科學發現以及普通人討論和辯論甚至有爭議且看似離奇的想法都取決於我們願意捍衛「有權犯錯的自由」。 令人驚訝的是，這保護了我們獲得真理的能力。 當那些掌權的人是錯誤的，但堅持認為那些有充分理由反對的人是在散佈虛假資訊時，保護「有權犯錯的自由」可以使那些實際上正確的人說服他人並促進糾正。
然而，允許人們犯錯誤可能會產生有害的、甚至是致命的後果。 我認為驗屍官的判斷是正確的，即謝米拉尼女士在道德上但非法律上對她對成年女兒施加的影響負有責任。 帕洛瑪的去世是悲慘和不必要的。 她似乎在心理上很脆弱，並且容易受到母親的影響。 然而，她是一個成年人，具有自主做出決定的能力，而且除了確保她充分了解情況外，在干預方面很難進行更多的道德行為。 兄弟們的憤怒是可以理解的，他們所指出的，將他們的母親的信仰與他們姐妹的死亡之間的直接聯繫似乎是不可否認的。 然而，確定一個人缺乏自主決定自身健康選擇的能力的標準必須保持非常高。
Truth and Freedom in Conflict? / 真理與自由的衝突？
How do we, liberals, reconcile potential conflicts between a commitment to truth and a commitment to freedom, particularly when untruths, if accepted as true, can lead directly to harm?
Defenders of individual freedom are typically very wary of the concept of ‘misinformation’ and especially of attempts to regulate or ban it for the good of society. It is not that we doubt that many truth claims presented as “information” are false, misleading and even dangerous, but that we cannot consent to allowing authorities to decide for us all what is true. It is all too easy for such power to be abused in the interests of ideological bias. This may not even be intentional. Confirmation bias makes us all prone to accept information that supports our existing beliefs and reject what challenges them. Even the most well-intentioned authority is not exempt from this.
我們這些自由主義者，如何調和對真理的承諾與對自由的承諾之間的潛在衝突？ 特別是當不實資訊被接受為真實時，可能會直接導致傷害。
捍衛個人自由的人通常非常警惕「虛假資訊」的概念，尤其是試圖爲了社會的利益而監管或禁止它的嘗試。 我們並非懷疑許多作為「資訊」呈現的真理主張都是錯誤的、具有誤導性的，甚至是危險的，而是我們不能同意讓當局為我們所有人決定什麼是真實的。 這種權力很容易被濫用，以符合意識形態偏見。 這甚至可能不是故意的。 確認偏差使我們都傾向於接受支援我們現有信念的資訊，並拒絕那些挑戰它們的資訊。 即使是最善意的人士也無法避免這種情況。
History is replete with examples of people in authority banning and penalizing certain ideas on the grounds that they are not true and will lead the citizenry into harmful error. These were the grounds for coercing everybody into certain denominations of Christianity and persecuting Jews, Muslims, atheists and members of other denominations of Christianity. It was the reason that Galileo’s writings were banned and he was subjected to house arrest and forced to recant his accurate position that the Earth revolves around the sun under threat of torture.
But today’s heretics are rarely Galileos. Many who reject well-established truths are not brave empiricists but conspiracy theorists, partisan ideologues, or frightened, disillusioned people looking for certainty in confusion. Some are good-faith, well-informed researchers working rigorously on hypotheses that will ultimately turn out to be wrong and which they will accept to be wrong. A handful of people currently questioning things we currently hold to be true will turn out to be correct and provide valuable correction that will benefit us all. It is for them we must protect the right to question and challenge any truth claim at all, no matter how well-established it appears to be.
歷史上有許多例子，人們以「這些想法不真實，會導致公民陷入有害的錯誤」為由，禁止和懲罰某些思想。 這是強迫每個人信奉特定的基督教教派並迫害猶太人、穆斯林、無神論者以及其他基督教教派成員的原因。 這也是伽利略的作品被禁止，他被迫在家中軟禁，並在遭受酷刑的威脅下撤回其準確的觀點，即地球圍繞太陽旋轉的原因。
但當今的異端很少是伽利略。 許多拒絕既定真理的人不是勇敢的實證主義者，而是陰謀論者、黨派意識形態者或在混亂中尋求確定性的恐懼和幻滅的人。 一些人是善意、知情的研究人員，他們嚴謹地研究假設，但最終這些假設會被證明是錯誤的，並且他們會接受它們是錯誤的。 少數目前質疑我們現在認為真實的事物的人，最終將會被證明是正確的，並提供寶貴的修正，這將使我們所有人受益。 爲了這些人，我們必須保護他們有權質疑和挑戰任何真理主張的權利，無論它看起來多麼根深蒂固。
How do we tell the difference between these people? It must ultimately come down to their methods and their epistemology – their ‘ways of knowing’ - and how they determine what is true. All ways of knowing are not equal. In the case of Galileo, his empirical, scientific, observations of the movement of planets which led him to say that the Earth orbits the Sun came into conflict with the scriptural, faith-based claim of the Church authorities that the Sun orbits the Earth. This was a conflict between evidence-based epistemology and narrative-based epistemology. We now accept that the Earth orbits the Sun because historical intellectual developments, most significantly, Enlightenment empiricism and rationalism have led us to accept that ‘truth’ is ‘that which corresponds with reality’ and that reality can be best established by evidence.
This development has been hugely beneficial and resulted in the development of life-saving medications, increased longevity, radically decreased infant mortality and technologies that enable us to travel into space, communicate with people on the other side of the world instantly and access information on anything we should want to know about with the tap of our fingers. This does, however, come at a price. We can easily find ‘information’ tailored to our own biases and pre-existing beliefs and a community of people who share these beliefs and will tell us that we are right. We are seeing considerable incentive to return to favouring a narrative-based epistemology over an evidence-based one.
我們如何區分這些人？ 最終，這必須取決於他們的方法和他們的「認識論」——他們「瞭解事物的方式」，以及他們如何確定什麼是真實的。 並非所有了解事物的方式都是平等的。 在伽利略的例子中，他通過對行星運動的經驗性、科學觀察得出的結論是地球圍繞太陽旋轉，這與教會權威基於經文和信仰的主張相沖突，即太陽圍繞地球旋轉。 這是一場關於以證據為基礎的認識論與以敘事為基礎的認識論之間的衝突。 我們現在接受地球圍繞太陽旋轉，因為歷史上的智力發展，最重要的是啓蒙運動的經驗主義和理性主義，使我們接受「真理」是「與現實相符的事物」，並且現實可以通過證據來最好地確定。
這種發展非常有益，並導致了拯救生命的藥物、壽命延長、嬰兒死亡率大幅下降以及使我們能夠進入太空、立即與世界另一端的的人們進行通訊以及通過點選我們的手指即可訪問有關任何我們想要了解的資訊的技術。 然而，這也需要付出代價。 我們很容易找到「資訊」，這些資訊是根據我們自己的偏見和先有信念量身定製的，並且有一個由人們組成的社區，他們分享這些信念，並告訴我們我們是正確的。 我們正在看到越來越傾向於迴歸以敘事為基礎的認識論，而不是以證據為基礎的認識論。
Why Humans Proliferate Bullshit / 人類為什麼會傳播虛假資訊？
In Cynical Theories, James Lindsay and I wrote about the evolution of postmodern thought into current Critical Social Justice (woke) activism. Postmodernism is defined as a ‘skepticism towards metanarratives’ and a favouring of diverse, local mini-narratives specific to groups. It advocated paralogy of legitimation - multiple ways of knowing which could all be accepted as legitimate. It challenged science, reason and modernity itself.
Jim and I identified a postmodern knowledge principle - radical skepticism as to whether objective knowledge or truth is obtainable and a commitment to cultural constructivism and a postmodern political principle - a belief that society is formed of systems of power and hierarchies, which decide what can be known and how. That is, postmodernism is defined by a rejection of evidence-based approaches to establishing what is true and a commitment to believing that knowledge is a construct of power, and it is the powerful in society who get to decide what is true and that they do so in their own interests. This is textbook conspiratorial thinking.
在《憤世不平的理論》（Cynical Theories）中，我和James Lindsay探討了後現代思想如何演變成當今的批判性社會正義（覺醒）運動。 後現代主義（Postmodernism）被定義為「對宏大敘事的懷疑」，以及傾向於特定群體的多樣化、本地化的微觀敘事。 它提倡合法性悖論——所有都可以被接受的多種認識方式。 它挑戰科學、理性以及現代本身。
我和Lindsay確定了一種後現代知識原則：對是否存在客觀知識或真理持徹底懷疑態度，並致力於文化建構主義；以及一種後現代政治原則：相信社會是由權力系統和等級結構組成的，這些系統決定了可以瞭解什麼以及如何瞭解。 也就是說，後現代主義的特點是拒絕以證據為基礎的方法來確定什麼是真實的，並致力於相信知識是權力的產物，並且是社會中的有權者來決定什麼是真實的，而且他們這樣做是爲了自己的利益。 這完全符合陰謀論的思維模式。
This type of thinking is not limited to left-wing academic theories. When ‘post-truth’ became the word of the year in 2016, many commentators (including me) were quick to note the similarity of the right-wing ‘post-truth’ phenomenon to the left-wing postmodern phenomenon. Defined as a preference for emotionally-resonant narratives over objective truth, post-truthers were equally likely to be radically skeptical of objective truth and believe that knowledge is a construct of power and serves the interests of the powerful. Donald Trump was quickly dubbed America’s first postmodern president.
For Critical Social Justice activists, the “privileged” control truth; for populists, the “elites” do. Both attack Enlightenment rationalism from different directions. Both believe that science serves the powerful. And both fuel a return to narrative over evidence.
This development does not, of course, indicate that right-wing figures or even left-wing ones, necessarily, have been reading Lyotard, Foucault and Derrida. Rather, they share a Counter-Enlightenment ethos that has its roots in the least rational aspects of human psychology. Humans are very invested in knowing. It is, of course, highly beneficial to our thriving to know things. However, if that were the only purpose our drive to know served, we would all be natural empiricists, rationalists and scientists, striving to make sure our knowledge corresponds with reality as closely as possible. Instead of having an inner scientist, as Jonathan Haidt describes it, we have an inner lawyer or inner public relations firm. Knowledge to humans is intrinsically tied into our reputations and status within our group. Being able to conform to our group narratives has likely been much more important to our survival than being right.
這種思維方式不僅限於左翼學術理論。 2016年，「後真相」成為年度詞彙，許多評論員（包括我）迅速指出右翼「後真相」現象與左翼後現代現象之間的相似之處。 「後真相主義者」被定義為更傾向於具有情感共鳴的敘事而非客觀真理，他們同樣可能對客觀真理持徹底懷疑態度，並相信知識是權力的產物，並且服務於有權者的利益。 很快，唐納德·特朗普（Donald Trump）就被稱為美國的第一位後現代總統。
對於批判性社會正義活動家來說，「特權階級」控制著真理；而對於民粹主義者來說，是「精英」。 兩者都從不同的角度攻擊啓蒙運動的理性主義。 他們都認為科學服務於有權力的人。 而且兩者都會導致敘事取代證據。
當然，這種發展並不意味著右翼人物或甚至左翼人物一定閱讀過Lyotard、Foucault和Derrida的作品。 而是說，他們共享一種反啓蒙精神，其根源在於人類心理中最不理性的方面。 人類非常重視「知道」。 當然，瞭解事物對我們的生存非常有益。 然而，如果「知道」的唯一目的是爲了我們能夠蓬勃發展，那麼我們都應該是自然主義者、理性主義者和科學家，努力確保我們的知識儘可能地與現實相符。 與其擁有喬納森·海特所描述的內在科學家，我們擁有一個內在的律師或公共關係公司。 對於人類來說，知識與我們在群體中的聲譽和地位息息相關。 能夠符合我們群體的敘事，可能比正確更重要於我們的生存。
Building our status and taking a leadership position within our groups is also tied to our relationship with knowledge. It carries social capital to be someone who knows and we are incentivised to compete with others for that position. It also brings a sense of security and control to feel one has a clear understanding of what is going on. When the group narrative is conspiratorial and not connected to reality, this can get harmful and dangerous very quickly. We saw this in the CSJ movement where adherents competed to find more and more things ‘problematic’ that had not previously been recognised as such leading to a rapidly increasing menu of utterances for which one could be cancelled. We see it in right-wing conspiracy theorists as they compete to be more radically sceptical of things held to be well-established to be true. A joke that exemplifies this attitude goes: “What’s the best way to win an argument with someone who says the moon landing was faked? Say “Wow, you still believe in the moon?”” This is the process by which ideological movements rapidly become increasingly unhinged and detached from reality.
在我們的群體中建立地位並佔據領導職位，也與我們對知識的關係息息相關。 成為一個「知道」的人會帶來社會資本，並且我們會受到激勵與其他競爭該位置。 同時，擁有對正在發生的事情的清晰理解也能帶來一種安全感和控制感。 當群體的敘事是陰謀論且與現實脫節時，這可能會迅速變得有害和危險。 我們在批判性社會正義運動中看到了這一點，其中信徒們競相發現越來越多的「有問題」的事物，這些事物之前並未被認為是問題，從而導致一個快速增長的言論清單，人們可以因此受到譴責。 我們也看到了右翼陰謀論者中的這種現象，他們競相對那些被普遍認為是真實的事情表現出更激進的懷疑態度。 一個體現這種態度的笑話是：「與一個人爭論的最佳方法是什麼，如果這個人說登月是假的？ 問他「哇，你還相信登月嗎？」」 這就是意識形態運動迅速變得越來越瘋狂和脫離現實的過程。
How We Curb Bullshit Without Denying Freedom / 如何限制虛假資訊，同時不剝奪自由
The only way for this competitive/status seeking drive within the realms of knowledge-production not to go insane is for it to be resolutely linked to reality and consequently to evidence-based epistemology. It requires for reputations to depend upon one’s truth claims being well-evidenced, well-reasoned and well…..true. While error is an inevitable part of knowledge-production and being honestly mistaken is no cause for shame and self-correction is particularly admirable, being wrong because one’s epistemology is geared around adherence to political ideology and tribal allegiances rather than correspondence with reality should indeed be shameful.
The development of the scientific method in which knowledge is always provisional and scientists form hypotheses and try to disprove them and also build their reputations by disproving other people’s has been highly productive. This system harnessed that competitive drive to spur the discovery of genuine knowledge that has been highly beneficial to our thriving and survival. When operating optimally, it requires participants to remain humble about their discoveries, to present evidence for them and to accept and respond to disconfirming evidence. This is manifestly absent in the postmodern left or post-truth right.
這種在知識生產領域內的競爭/追求地位的驅動力，只有當它與現實緊密相連，並且因此與基於證據的認識論相結合時，才不會變得瘋狂。 這要求聲譽取決於一個人的真實主張是否得到充分的證據支援、經過良好的推理，以及……真實。 雖然錯誤是知識生產中不可避免的一部分，誠實地犯錯並非羞恥，並且自我糾正尤其值得稱讚，但如果一個人的認識論圍繞著對政治意識形態和部落忠誠的遵守，而不是與現實相符，那麼犯錯確實應該感到羞恥。
科學方法的發展，在這種方法中知識始終是暫時的，科學家提出假設並嘗試證明其錯誤，並且他們也通過駁斥其他人的觀點來建立自己的聲譽，已經非常有效。 這種系統利用了這種競爭驅動力來促進真正知識的發現，這對我們的繁榮和生存非常有益。 在最佳狀態下，它要求參與者對他們的發現保持謙遜，提供證據支援它們，並接受和迴應反駁性證據。 這在後現代左派或後真相右派中明顯不存在。
Producing knowledge through empirical rigour is hard work while spinning emotive stories is easy. There is a tendency now to accuse those pointing out this fact of “elitism” and “credentialism,” and there can be legitimate class concerns when truth-seeking institutions are dominated by those who have been able to access advanced degrees. The solution, however, is not to lower epistemic standards but to broaden access to good education. Truth cannot be democratized by redefining it as whatever people feel is true out of a sense of fairness or ‘equity.’
On a fundamental level, however, the issue of how we determine what is true is not limited to scientists, experts and intellectuals but one that affects us all. We all produce and consume knowledge in our daily lives and the way in which we go about doing this matters, both individually and culturally. It affects how we keep ourselves informed, how we decide to educate our children, how we make decisions for our material lives and relationships, how we understand the world around us and how we evaluate and select our political leaders. Making evaluations and forming conclusions based on evidence, reason and consistent principle serves us well in every domain. Doing so based on ideological narratives and tribal allegiances does not.
通過經驗嚴謹來產生知識是艱苦的工作，而編造充滿情感的故事則很容易。 現在有一種傾向去指責那些指出這一事實的人為「精英主義」和「學歷主義」，並且當追求真理的機構被那些能夠獲得高級學位的人所主導時，可能會存在合法的階級問題。 然而，解決方案不是降低認識論標準，而是擴大對良好教育的獲取機會。 真理不能通過重新定義它來使其民主化，即將其定義為人們出於公平或「平等」感而認為真實的一切。
從根本上說，關於我們如何確定什麼是真的這個問題，不僅限於科學家、專家和知識分子，而是影響著我們所有人。 我們在日常生活中都生產和消費知識，而我們進行這些活動的方式至關重要，無論是在個人層面還是文化層面。 這會影響我們如何保持知情，如何決定教育我們的孩子，如何為我們的物質生活和人際關係做出決策，如何理解我們周圍的世界以及如何評估和選擇我們的政治領導者。 在各個領域，基於證據、理性和一致原則進行評估和形成結論對我們都有益。 反之，基於意識形態敘事和部落忠誠度則不然。
The surge of conspiratorial thinking across the political spectrum marks a weakening of our cultural commitment to evidence, reason and consistent principle and a reversion to narrative tribalism. WEIRD societies—Western, Educated, Industrialised, Rich, Democratic—have been exceptional precisely because they built norms that mitigated our tendency to factionalise into narrative-based tribes. They brought people with different ideas together to argue out their cases with a collaborative expectation that their arguments will be evidenced, reasoned and consistent and that failures to be so were undermining of credibility and ultimately disqualifying. We have never achieved ideal manifestations of this aim, but having this as an ideal has been incredibly productive. Losing this ideal to an extent where people feel confident to make demonstrably false truth claims, fallacious arguments and use inconsistent principles in the knowledge that this will not cost them the respect of their ideological tribe as long as their output upholds the narrative is deeply destructive.
在整個政治光譜上，陰謀論思維的興起標誌著我們對證據、理性、一致原則的文化承諾正在減弱，並回歸到敘事部落主義。 WEIRD社會——西方、受過教育的、工業化的、富裕的、民主的社會——之所以是特殊的，正是因為它們建立了規範，以減輕我們將自己分裂成基於敘事的部落的傾向。 它們將不同想法的人聚集在一起，期望他們能夠通過協作的方式論證自己的觀點，並且他們的論點應該有證據支援、經過合理的推理，並且未能做到如此會損害其可信度，並最終使其失去資格。 我們從未實現這種目標的理想狀態，但擁有這個理想已經非常有效。 當人們感到自信地提出明顯錯誤的真主觀斷言、謬誤的論證，並在明知這不會讓他們在意識形態部落中失去尊重的情況下使用不一致的原則時，這種理想的喪失是極其具有破壞性的。
The solution cannot be censorship. It not only gives authorities the power to decide what counts as misinformation which is highly vulnerable to ideological bias. Banning misinformation glamorises it and causes ideological tribes to place more confidence in it, bonding together more tightly over the conspiratorial belief that they are the Holders of the Truth They Don’t Want You To Know.
Rather than trying to control what people may think, we desperately need a cultural revolution on how to think. We need, in short, a second Enlightenment. We need a significant mass of people to become so sick of the ubiquitous bullshit coming from all sides that we have a cultural shift towards an increased demand for rigorous methods of research among experts and respect for critical thinking among our peers. We need increased intolerance of emotionally resonant narratives being spun by our political leaders and experts, and for indulging in irrational and conspiratorial thinking to lose us respect among our peers.
Ideally, we need this to happen quickly before we all die of a plague while being cancelled for using transphobic lego.
解決方案不能是審查制度。 它不僅賦予了當局決定什麼是虛假資訊的權力，而這非常容易受到意識形態偏見的影響。 禁止虛假資訊會使其變得光鮮亮麗，並導致意識形態部落更加信任它，並在對他們認為「他們不想讓你知道的真相」的陰謀論信念中更加緊密地團結在一起。
與其試圖控制人們可能思考的內容，我們迫切需要一場關於如何思考的文化革命。 簡而言之，我們需要第二次啓蒙運動。 我們需要一大批人厭倦來自各方的無處不在的胡言亂語，從而實現一種文化轉變，即對專家進行嚴格的研究方法的需求增加，以及對同伴之間的批判性思維的尊重。 我們需要對政治領導人和專家所編造的情感共鳴敘事更加不寬容，並且沉迷於非理性、陰謀論思維會讓我們在同伴中失去尊重。
理想情況下，我們需要這種情況儘快發生，以免我們都因瘟疫而死亡，同時又因為使用恐同樂高而受到抵制。
The Fight Against Institutional Bullshit / 對抗體制性的胡言亂語
Yet again, the pressing issue facing us is not one of partisan politics. It one of people who care about what is true, what is well-reasoned and what protects individual freedom versus those who seek to make reality conform to their ideological narrative, engage in fallacious reasoning and inconsistent principles to achieve this goal and enforce their own beliefs on everybody else.
We must acknowledge that experts and institutions have often failed. The ideological bias of academia, especially during Covid, when public health rules bent for political protest, has badly damaged trust. It is not unreasonable for people to wonder what else they are being misled about. Such inconsistencies feed the conspiratorial mindset and undermine confidence in legitimate science, worsening problems like vaccine hesitancy.
We need experts who hold themselves and one another to high epistemic standards. Universities and research institutions must recommit to academic freedom, viewpoint diversity, and falsifiability. Disciplines that reject these, particularly those rooted in postmodern theory and power analysis, should be free to exist but recognized for what they are: ideological frameworks, not knowledge.
然而，我們面臨的緊迫問題再次不是黨派政治的問題。 而是關於那些關心真相、重視理性思考以及致力於保護個人自由的人，與那些試圖使現實符合其意識形態敘述的人之間的鬥爭。 後者會使用錯誤的推理和不一致的原則來實現這一目標，並強加自己的信仰給所有人。
我們必須承認，專家和機構經常失敗。 尤其是在新冠疫情期間，學術界的意識形態偏見（例如，公共衛生規定爲了政治抗議而改變）嚴重損害了信任。 人們懷疑自己是否還被誤導其他事情，這並不奇怪。 這種不一致性助長了陰謀論思維，並削弱了人們對合法科學的信心，從而加劇了諸如疫苗猶豫等問題。
我們需要那些堅持高學術標準的專家。 大學和研究機構必須重新致力於學術自由、觀點多樣性和可證偽性。 那些拒絕這些原則的學科，特別是那些根植於後現代理論和權力分析的學科，應該可以存在，但要認識到它們的本質：它們是意識形態框架，而不是知識。
The postmodern left has done real damage to epistemic trust within institutions, but the post-truth right is culpable in its own domains. It is bizarre that so many on the right who have become skeptical of expertise seem to have forgotten that politicians are meant to be experts in governance, whose claims must be evidence-based and verifiable. Instead, we appear to have grown resigned to responding to demonstrable and egregious falsehood and fabrication from political leaders addressing issues of health, the economy, employment, national defence, welfare programmes, immigration and more with critical think pieces as though this is an inevitable part of political ‘spin’ that we must live with, rather than our elected leaders lying to us, which we should not tolerate. If we need to demand higher standards in academia and other institutions of knowledge production (and we do), surely we also need to demand them from our leaders. Democracy cannot function on lies.
On an institutional level, we must demand a measurable commitment to truth. In academic research, truth must be a criterion for anything that aspires to be called knowledge. Claims that cannot be falsified or corrected—such as “white fragility” or “gender identity” as inner essence—may be explored as philosophical ideas, but they are not knowledge to be used for social engineering.
後現代主義左派對機構內的知識信任造成了真正的損害，但後真相右翼在其自身領域也負有責任。 令人費解的是，許多變得對專家持懷疑態度的右翼人士似乎忘記了，政治家本應是治理方面的專家，他們的主張必須基於證據並且可以驗證。 相反，我們似乎已經習慣於應對來自政治領導人的明顯和嚴重的虛假陳述和捏造，這些陳述涉及健康、經濟、就業、國家安全、福利專案、移民等諸多領域，而我們卻以批判性的評論來回應，彷彿這是政治「宣傳」中不可避免的一部分，而我們必須接受，而不是我們的民選領導人對我們撒謊，而這不應該被容忍。 如果我們需要要求學術界和其他知識生產機構提高標準（而且確實需要），那麼我們肯定也需要從我們的領導人那裡要求更高的標準。 民主不能建立在謊言之上。
在制度層面，我們必須要求對其承諾真相進行可衡量的保證。 在學術研究中，真理必須是任何自稱是「知識」的東西的標準。 那些無法被證偽或糾正的聲明——例如「白人脆弱性」或「性別認同」作為內在本質——可以作為哲學思想進行探討，但它們不是用於社會工程學的知識。
Disciplines in the hard and social sciences that do commit to objectivity, empirical measurement, and falsifiability must also be expected to present their findings honestly, with the necessary qualifications and limitations, and to correct errors when they occur. Politicians and government officials who cite expert research must convey those same qualifications, not cherry-pick results or spin data to justify policy.
The right to hold false beliefs does not extend to those presenting information as true in their official capacity. Political leaders are public servants, and their statements must meet the same evidentiary standards we expect from scientists. Speeches should indeed be fact-checked but rather than merely presenting the results of this in articles for public outrage; there should be institutional expectations that leaders directly address them, correct their errors, issue public apologies, and face disqualification for deliberate falsehoods. There needs to be genuine disincentives for deception or shoddiness.
在自然科學和社會科學中，那些致力於客觀性、實證測量和可證偽性的學科，也必須被期望誠實地呈現他們的研究成果，並附上必要的限定和侷限性，並在出現錯誤時及時糾正。 引用專家研究的政治家和政府官員必須傳達這些相同的限定條件，而不是選擇性地引用結果或操縱數據來為政策辯護。
持有虛假信念的權利並不適用於那些在官方場合將資訊呈現為真實的人。 政治領導人是公務員，他們的聲明必須符合我們對科學家的期望的相同證據標準。 演講確實應該接受事實覈查，但與其僅僅在文章中呈現這些結果以引發公眾憤怒，不如建立制度性的期望，要求領導人直接解決這些問題、糾正錯誤、公開道歉，並因故意捏造而面臨取消資格的處罰。 需要對欺騙或敷衍行為產生真正的阻礙。
Make Bullshit Embarrassing Again / 再次讓謊言蒙羞
On a cultural level, there is a need for a surge of popular resistance not simply to the side which is not our own but to bullshit consistently. This is something we can all take part in, but it does require being willing to go against the narrative of one’s own tribe. We can hold ourselves to high levels of truthfulness, reasonableness and consistency and we can hold our own social circles and political tribes to those standards.
This is difficult on a social level because we are such social animals and the current state of political discourse has driven us more deeply into our tribes for security. It can also feel counterintuitive and, indeed, be argued to be strategically unwise while we are in a state that feels very much like war. Inter-group critique with a view to self-correction is something that happens in peacetime, surely? To do so right now can only divide and weaken our own side and assist the other side. “Don’t punch left” is what those of us on the left concerned about the rise of the Critical Social Justice movement have consistently been told. “No enemies to the right” is what principled conservatives who wish to preserve the principles of conservatism and are concerned about the betrayal of them by the populist right and far-right are being told right now.
在文化層面，我們需要一場大眾反抗運動，這場運動不僅要針對與我們對立的陣營，更要針對持續存在的謊言。 這是一個我們可以共同參與的事情，但它需要我們願意挑戰自己所屬群體的主流敘事。 我們可以對自己和我們的社交圈以及政治群體設定高標準的真誠、理性一致性。
在社會層面，這很難實現，因為我們是高度的社會動物，而目前的政治交流（discourse）已經將我們更深入地推向了自己的陣營以尋求安全感。 這也可能感覺違反直覺，並且實際上可以被認為是在我們身處一種非常像戰爭的狀態時，從戰略上來說是不明智的。 以自我糾正為目的的跨群體批評通常發生在和平時期，對吧？ 現在這樣做只會分裂和削弱我們自己的陣營，並幫助另一方。 「不要攻擊左派」是那些擔心批判社會公正運動興起的左翼人士一直被告知的話。「不要攻擊右派」是那些希望維護保守主義原則、並且擔心民粹主義右翼和極右翼背叛這些原則的正直保守派正在被告知的話。
I frequently hear from people on the right who have appreciated my criticisms of the Critical Social Justice movement that I am making a mistake now in being critical of the illiberal populist right. They tell me that the time to worry about illiberal elements on the right - which they acknowledge to exist - is when they have control of the institutions. While the CSJ movement is still deeply entrenched there, they think it is foolish for me to divide my energies in this way. Meanwhile, I hear from people on the left who have also appreciated my criticisms of the CSJ movement that my time for criticising that should be past. It was worthwhile my focusing on them when there was still time to hold back the illiberal anti-woke backlash, but it is quite clearly here now. I should not be focusing on silly DEI policies in universities when the illiberal right is in the the US government and is threatening the very foundations of liberal democracy, due process and freedom of belief and speech.
I understand these objections and I am particularly sympathetic to those coming from the liberal left. I am much more worried about the rise of the illiberal right at this time. It does not follow, however, that I would be of most use in combating that were I to cease to care when my own side cares nothing for truth or reason or freedom; if I were to lose my integrity and principled consistency. Instead, I would lose any credibility I have with conservatives and any influence with those who are concerned about current developments but hesitant about pushing back against them. At the same time, I would cease to be of any use in fixing the problems on the left which is something that desperately needs to happen if we wish swing voters to vote for it again. Most importantly, I would be contributing to the narrative-based, postmodern/post-truth approach to politics which is driving increasing radicalism and polarisation and further undermining the liberal, empirical and rational principles underlying our liberal democracies.
I maintain that we all do best to hold to those principles and use them to address the problems on our own side. We can and must criticise the problems on the other side, but everybody is always good at spotting the flaws in positions they don’t agree with and our ability to meaningfully effect change is very limited. Among our own tribe, we have some measure of influence and we can work with the human need to be respected within our tribes. We can use this to push for establishing criteria of honesty and integrity, concern for truth and reason and consistent principles as essential to earning and maintaining that respect.
我經常聽到來自右翼的人，他們感謝我對批判社會公正運動的批評，認為我現在批評非自由主義民粹主義右翼是一個錯誤。 他們告訴我，現在擔心右翼中的非自由主義因素（雖然他們承認這些因素確實存在）的時機是當它們控制了機構時。 在批判社會公正運動仍然根深蒂固的時候，他們認為我將精力分散到其他方面是愚蠢的。 另一方面，我也聽到來自左翼的人，他們也感謝我對批判社會公正運動的批評，認為現在應該停止批評它。 當還有時間阻止非自由主義的反「覺醒」反彈時，關注它們是有意義的，但現在這種情況已經很明顯了。 我不應該專注于大學中那些愚蠢的多樣性、公平和包容 (DEI) 政策，而應該關注非自由主義右翼正在美國政府中掌權，並威脅到自由民主、正當程式以及信仰和言論自由的基礎。
我理解這些反對意見，並且特別同情來自自由派左翼的觀點。 我現在對非自由主義右翼的崛起更加擔憂。 然而，這並不意味著如果我放棄關心我的陣營是否重視真理、理性或自由，我就能最好地對抗它； 如果我失去我的正直和原則一致性。 相反，我會失去我在保守派中的任何可信度以及在那些對當前發展感到擔憂但猶豫著反對他們的人中的任何影響力。 同時，我也將不再能夠解決左翼中存在的問題，而這是我們希望搖擺選民再次投票給它所需要的。 最重要的是，我將為那種基於敘事的、後現代/後真相的政治方法做出貢獻，這種方法正在推動日益增長的激進主義和兩極分化，並進一步破壞了支撐我們自由民主制度的自由、經驗性和理性原則。
我認為我們都應該努力堅持這些原則，並利用它們來解決我們自己陣營中的問題。 我們可以並且必須批評另一方的問題，但每個人總是擅長發現他們不同意的位置上的缺陷，而我們有意義地改變現狀的能力非常有限。 在我們自己的群體中，我們擁有一定的影響力，我們可以利用人類在群體中獲得尊重這一需求。 我們可以利用這一點來推動建立誠實和正直的標準，關注真理和理性以及一致的原則，作為贏得和維持這種尊重所必需的條件。
We are all well-aware of the problem of “audience-capture” in which someone who has built a reputation among their political group is then incentivised by positive feedback to become more narrative-driven and radical and thus, typically, more further away from what is true. We have all seen people who used to make reasonable, evidence-based and consistently principled arguments succumb to this and fall off a cliff into ideological extremism. We can choose not to be part of incentivising this, but instead disincentive it by criticising it and reducing the respect we have for that individual. We each choose where to bestow our respect and we can choose to bestow it upon those who maintain their integrity and commitment to truth.
We can refuse to reward those who seek to build reputations via competitive status-seeking in the form of becoming more radically committed to ideological narratives and conspiracy theories than everybody else. Quell those with a narcissistic drive to present themselves as a superior knower within a tribe by being more ‘woke’ ‘red-pilled’ or generally enlightened to systems of power than the average pleb who is allegedly still sleepwalking through it. Do not regard this posturing as a sign of purity or commitment or enlightenment and do not give it status. Radical interpretations of how our social systems work and how the ‘privileged’ or ‘elites’ are deceiving people might be correct, but, if they are, this will be determined by calm, sane and reasonable presentation of evidence to this effect, rather than radical fervour and scorning the ignorance of anyone who does not uncritically accept these claims.
We can regard those who seek to shock and impress with radicalism, “edginess” or vice signalling as adolescent thinkers who are best ignored until such time as they can contribute seriously and thoughtfully to grown up conversation.
我們都非常清楚「觀眾捕捉」的問題，在這種問題中，那些在自己的政治群體中建立聲譽的人會受到積極反饋的激勵，從而變得更加以敘事為導向和激進，因此通常會離真相越來越遠。 我們都見過曾經提出合理、基於證據且始終堅持原則的論點的人屈服於此，並陷入意識形態極端主義的深淵。 我們可以選擇不成為鼓勵這種行為的一部分，而是通過批評它並減少我們對該個人的尊重來抑制它。 我們每個人都選擇給予誰尊重，並且可以選擇將尊重賦予那些保持正直和致力於真理的人。
我們可以拒絕獎勵那些試圖通過在群體中變得比其他人更激進地奉獻于意識形態敘事和陰謀論來建立聲譽的人。 通過表現得比普通人「更覺醒」、「更有洞察力」或總體上對權力體系更加「開明」，從而壓制那些具有自戀驅動，試圖將自己塑造成群體中一個卓越的「知識分子」。 不要將這種姿態視為純潔、奉獻或啓蒙的標誌，也不要給予它任何地位。 關於我們社會系統如何運作以及「特權者」或「精英」如何欺騙人們的激進解釋可能正確，但如果它們是正確的，那麼這將會通過冷靜、理性和合理地呈現相關證據來確定，而不是通過激進的熱情和鄙視那些不盲目接受這些主張的人。
我們可以將那些試圖用激進主義、「前衛」或「道德優越感」來震驚和印象深刻的人視為幼稚的思想者，最好忽略他們，直到他們能夠認真而深思熟慮地為成熟的對話做出貢獻。
Resist the temptation to succumb to these adolescent incentives yourself. The most effective way to push back against irrational, illiberal, conspiratorial thinking is to pierce the self-image its adherents depend upon—the notion that they are the uniquely enlightened “cool kids” who see through what the rest of us allegedly cannot. That illusion only survives if enough people collude in it. If you are on the left, resist the “peer pressure” to affirm the postmodern narratives and if you are on the right, the post-truth ones. Don’t fear accusations of naivety, privilege, ignorance, or insufficient radicalism for declining to endorse unevidenced claims. There is no shame in demanding evidence, coherence, and principled reasoning. The shame lies in abandoning them. Ultimately, the cultural goal is clear: we must make adherence to narrative-based epistemologies and conspiracy theories a source of embarrassment rather than prestige.
History shows us that neither truth nor conflict resolution can be achieved by adherence to tribal narratives, no matter how satisfying they may be or how much more easily they lend themselves to simple answers, fightable enemies and a feeling of control. They can only be achieved by maintaining respect for evidence, reason, and open debate. That expectation has been under threat across the political spectrum for some time, and its erosion is already harming individuals, institutions and culture. The solution cannot lie in giving authorities the power to decide what is misinformation or in circling the wagons around our own tribal narratives and engaging in a war of bullshit, irrationalism and situationally-malleable principles. We must use the influence we each have in our circles to bestow our respect on those who care about what is true, what is reasonable and what upholds consistent principles and deny it to those who betray those values.
Make bullshit embarrassing again.
Bring on Enlightenment 2.0.
抵制屈服於這些幼稚激勵的誘惑。 反擊非理性、反自由主義和陰謀論思維最有效的方法是打破其信徒所依賴的自我形象——即他們是那些能夠看穿我們其他人據稱看不到事物的獨特「開明」的「酷孩子」的觀念。 這種幻覺只有在足夠多的人共同維護它時才能生存。 如果您是左派，請抵制確認後現代敘事的「同伴壓力」，如果您是右派，則抵制後真相敘事。 不要害怕因拒絕認可未經證實的聲明而受到天真、特權、無知或不夠激進的指責。 要求證據、連貫性和原則性推理沒有任何恥辱可言。 恥辱在於放棄它們。 最終，文化目標是明確的：我們必須使堅持基於敘事的認識論和陰謀論成為一種令人尷尬的事物，而不是一種聲望。
歷史表明，無論這些敘事多麼令人滿意，或者它們是否更容易提供簡單的答案、可以戰鬥的敵人以及一種控制感，真理和衝突解決都不能通過堅持部落敘事來實現。 只有通過保持對證據、理性以及公開辯論的尊重才能實現。 這種期望在一段時間內一直受到整個政治光譜的威脅，並且它的侵蝕已經損害了個人、機構和文化。 解決方案不能在於賦予權威決定什麼是虛假資訊的權力，也不能在於在我們自己的部落敘事周圍築起壁壘，並進行一場充滿胡說八道、非理性以及根據情況而變化的原則的戰爭。 我們必須利用我們每個人在圈子中的影響力，將我們的尊重給予那些關心真相、理性和堅持一致原則的人，並拒絕給予那些背叛這些價值觀的人。
讓胡說八道再次變得尷尬。
開啟啓蒙運動 2.0。
非文章內附的現實主義 vs 理想主義構圖
