维特根斯坦，疼痛

Context:

297. Of course, if water boils in a pot, steam comes out of the pot and also pictured steam comes out of the pictured pot. But what if one insisted on saying that there must also be something boiling in the picture of the pot?

We can describe Wittgenstein's thinking here as follows. Things happen in our bodies which cause the verbal and other behaviour through which we express pain, as things happen in a boiling pot which cause the expression of steam. (The box in the previous metaphor is replaced by the pot in this.) In order to understand these internal events we form a representation (picture) of them in terms of the mind/body container (the picture of the pot). But in using this picture, we perforce represent the internal events as occurring, not in the physical space of the body where they actually occur, but rather as in a space of a distinct kind. We are misled by our form of representation, in such a way that we think of the internal events with which we are concerned as occurring not in the pot (the body), but in the picture of the pot (the metaphorical space internal to the mind/body container).

You're asking for a clear distinction between:

1. What is really in the pot (i.e., what actually happens in the body),

2. And what we mistakenly think is in the pot (but is actually only a feature of our mental picture or metaphor).

Let’s break this down carefully, in line with Wittgenstein’s thinking.

🫙 1. What is really in the pot (the body)?

These are objective physiological processes — measurable, observable things that happen in the nervous system or tissues:

• Neurons firing

• Nociceptors (pain receptors) activating

• Inflammation in tissue

• Hormonal responses

• Electrical and chemical signals being transmitted

These are events in physical space, and they can be studied by neuroscience, medicine, etc.

🧠 2. What we believe is in the pot — but is only in our picture

This is where the metaphor misleads us:

We think there must be something like:

• “A pain as a thing located in the body”

• “A feeling that resides somewhere inside the person, in a container-like space”

• “A mental state that sits inside the head like steam in a pot”

But:

There is no such inner object or substance called "pain" inside the pot — no “thing” we can point to that is pain.

Instead, “pain” is a way of behaving, expressing, reporting, and reacting, not something we discover as a private object inside us.

So, when we say things like:

“He has pain in his head,”
“She is hiding what she really feels,”
“I want to know what’s going on in his mind,”

— we are not literally locating internal entities, but are using deeply ingrained metaphorical pictures (e.g. container metaphors) that make us think there's a place “inside” where feelings or thoughts reside.

🧩 Wittgenstein’s Point

The picture of the pot (or the mind/body container) makes us think there’s something inside it called “pain” or “mental state.”

But:

• What’s really inside is just bodily processes.

• The rest is a grammatical illusion created by our language and imagery.

We confuse:

• The body as a physical system
  with

• A picture of a container filled with hidden contents

And that’s the problem.

🎯 Summary

Question

Answer

What’s really in the pot?

Nerve activity, tissue damage, physiological processes — physical events in the body

What do we think is in the pot (misleadingly)?

A thing called "pain" or "emotion" that resides inside — a mental picture of hidden inner stuff

What’s Wittgenstein’s critique?

We are misled by the grammar and imagery of our language into thinking inner states are like substances in a container — but that’s not how subjective experience actually works.

Would you like a simple example using a real-life situation (e.g. a child saying “I have a pain in my tummy”) to illustrate this?