Transnational Repression as an Intrusion into Democratic Sovereignty and Institutions - Part II

Erosion of Institutional Logics Through Policy Manipulation and Foreign Interference

Beyond directly targeting individuals or communities, transnational repression can subtly distort the policies and institutional logics of democratic states. Here we refer to the norms, procedures, and decision-making principles that guide institutions like law enforcement agencies, immigration systems, legislatures, and international organizations. Authoritarian regimes, in their efforts to quash dissent globally, often engage in what might be called “policy laundering,” outsourcing of coercion, and normalization of foreign interference. These processes can lead democratic institutions to behave in ways antithetical to their core values, thereby eroding the internal logic that is supposed to underpin democratic governance.

One mechanism is the manipulation of democratic institutions into doing the bidding of authoritarian regimes under a veneer of legality. As noted earlier, when an origin state co-opts a host state’s legal system (e.g., via extradition or INTERPOL abuse), it is not just undermining rule of law in the narrow sense, but also perverting the purpose of those institutions. Law enforcement and immigration authorities in democracies are meant to protect public safety and uphold justice—not serve as enforcers for dictatorships. Yet, numerous cases show how authoritarians launder their repression through international cooperation. In the case of Rwandan dissident Leopold Munyakazi, for example, Rwanda leveraged both international law enforcement (an INTERPOL notice for fabricated charges) and the U.S. immigration system to achieve his deportation. The U.S. asylum system initially provided him refuge, but under pressure of dubious allegations (and a parallel propaganda campaign to demonize him), his asylum was denied and he was ultimately removed to Rwanda. In hindsight, this appears as a manipulation of U.S. processes: Rwanda repurposed tools meant for catching fugitives and adjudicating refugee status into weapons against a peaceful regime critic. The institutional logic—granting asylum to those fleeing persecution—was turned on its head, as the persecuting state effectively influenced the host’s asylum outcomes. This represents a deeper erosion: democratic institutions are designed to be impartial and humane, yet they risk being twisted to mirror the repressive logic of autocracies.

Similarly, when democratic states become complicit in “renditions” or extra-legal transfers, their security or intelligence agencies adopt the logic of their authoritarian partners, sidelining due process. During the post-9/11 period, some Western democracies colluded in the rendition of terror suspects to countries known for torture, effectively outsourcing harsh interrogation. While that policy was distinct (counterterrorism-related), it set a precedent and mechanism that some authoritarian states have exploited to demand dissidents under the guise of “terrorism.” For instance, China has increasingly labeled Uyghur activists abroad as “terrorists” or “extremists” to induce host countries to detain or deport them. If a democracy, due to bilateral relations or misjudgment, buys into that narrative without scrutiny, it ends up importing the authoritarian logic of conflating dissent with terrorism. This is indeed policy laundering: the authoritarian regime’s policy (suppressing ethnic dissent as “counter-terrorism”) gets laundered through the policies of democracies that would normally reject such conflation.

We also see the outsourcing of governance in the form of democracies tacitly allowing foreign security services to operate in ways they should not. A prominent example is the tolerance some countries initially showed towards China’s “Operation Fox Hunt,” which ostensibly sought to repatriate Chinese fugitives abroad. In certain instances, Chinese agents entered other countries (sometimes with informal host permission) to pressure targets to return to China. Some of these targets were not corrupt officials as claimed, but political dissidents or unwanted minorities. By acquiescing or turning a blind eye, the host states effectively outsourced the handling of those individuals to Chinese security, relinquishing their own institutional responsibility to evaluate asylum claims or protect individuals from coercion. This kind of normalized interference can stem from a mindset of “not wanting trouble” or prioritizing bilateral ties over principles. If repeated, it creates a parallel channel of governance: rather than a clear procedure (e.g., if China wants someone, it should file a legal request that goes through courts), an informal process takes over (foreign agents directly intervening). That erodes the institutional logic of transparency and accountability.

Another area of concern is how policy and norm setting at the international level can be skewed by authoritarian influence, feeding back into domestic institutions. Authoritarian states actively work in multilateral forums to reshape norms in their favor. For instance, they push broad definitions of extremism or cybercrime in U.N. discussions that could legitimize crackdowns on activists (thereby justifying transnational repression as “international security cooperation”). If democracies are not vigilant, they might unwittingly endorse such norms. Freedom House has noted that “nondemocratic governments work together to weaken universal human rights norms at international organizations”, and even use those forums to retaliate against activists (for example, blocking U.N. accreditation for NGOs critical of them, or harassing dissidents who testify). This can erode institutional logic at home by gradually shifting what behaviors are considered acceptable. For example, if an authoritarian regime manages to pass an INTERPOL resolution that reduces scrutiny on red notices, democratic police might take those notices at face value, changing their standard operating procedures detrimentally.

Within democratic governance, the normalization of foreign interference can also dull the response of institutions that should act. If incidents of transnational repression are seen as “just diplomatic issues” or routine, security agencies might treat them with less urgency than other security threats. This is a concern noted by analysts who say democracies have been reactive and fragmented in addressing TNRatlantic. A lack of clear doctrine or definition (many countries only recently even named the phenomenon) meant that, institutionally, there was no playbook. Immigration officers might not have guidelines to detect when an extradition is politically motivated; local police might dismiss harassment of an exile as a personal dispute rather than possible state-sponsored intimidation. This gap allowed authoritarian interference to proceed unchecked, effectively normalizing it by default. Only now are some countries establishing official definitions and case-tracking mechanisms for transnational repression. The very need to do so underscores that previously, institutional responses were ad hoc, often falling through bureaucratic cracks (e.g., between police and intelligence, or between national and local authorities).

Institutional logics are also eroded when democratic states compromise on their values for political expediency, which authoritarian regimes often encourage. A vivid instance is Turkey’s pressure on European states to crack down on Kurdish and Gülenist dissidents in exchange for migration control cooperation or NATO-related concessions. If a democracy starts making exceptions—like surveilling an activist not because they violated any law, but to appease a foreign partner—it undermines the consistency and impartiality of its institutions. Over time, such exceptions could morph into policy: e.g., an immigration service might adopt an informal practice to quietly reject more asylum claims from dissidents of a certain country to avoid conflict with that country. This kind of “outsourcing of censorship” was seen in cases where Chinese officials pressured Western academic or publishing institutions to cancel events or censor content critical of China, leveraging access or market power. If institutions succumb frequently, censorship becomes partly outsourced to the foreign authority’s preferences.

All these examples point to a creeping phenomenon: democratic institutions risk mirroring authoritarian practices under certain conditions, thereby losing their distinct logic. A law enforcement system that uncritically implements another country’s politically driven arrest warrant, an intelligence service that swaps dissidents like pawns in the name of realpolitik, or a university that polices speech to avoid angering a distant government—all are betraying their foundational principles.

To combat this, democracies are being called to reinforce institutional guardrails. Policy recommendations emphasize training officials to recognize transnational repression and to “avoid unwitting complicity”. For example, technology companies (integral to public life now) are urged to have strategies against digital repression so they do not inadvertently assist it. Governments are advised to tighten vetting of foreign diplomatic staff and requests so their systems are not easily manipulated. The underlying aim is to re-align institutions with their proper logic: police protect the vulnerable, immigration asylum systems shield the persecuted, universities uphold free inquiry, and so on. Transnational repression is corrosive precisely because it tries to turn those logics inside out—making protectors into persecutors and open forums into controlled spaces.

In summary, transnational repression erodes institutional logics by perverting democratic processes into tools of autocracy, delegating state functions to foreign powers, and quietly acculturating interference as normal. The “software” of democracy—its norms and procedures—can be subtly rewritten if authoritarian influence is unchecked. Reasserting democratic control and integrity means both resisting direct interference and inoculating institutions against being repurposed. This might involve new laws (like Magnitsky-style sanctions for foreign officials who misuse Interpol or harm exile), diplomatic frameworks (e.g., a proposed Council of Europe convention on transnational repression to establish clear standards and cooperation against it), and an uncompromising stance that democratic institutions will not be conscripted into silencing dissent. Maintaining the clear logic of governance based on rights and accountability is crucial; without it, democracies risk gradually adopting the very authoritarian practices they oppose.

Erosion of Civic Trust and Democratic Coherence

The cumulative effect of the aforementioned erosions is a damage to the civic trust and social cohesion that underpin democratic life. Democracies function not only through institutions and laws but through an implicit social contract: residents trust that their government will protect them and their rights, and citizens trust each other enough to cooperate in civic and political processes despite differences. Transnational repression, by introducing fear, mistrust, and division, undercuts this fabric of trust and shared democratic identity. This final dimension is more diffuse but deeply consequential: it is about how foreign authoritarian interventions can fray the internal unity and confidence of democratic societies.

One major impact is on the trust of targeted communities in their host state’s institutions. When diaspora groups see foreign agents operating with relative impunity, or feel that authorities are not taking the threat seriously, their confidence in the government’s ability and willingness to protect them diminishes. For example, many Uyghur refugees and other Chinese diaspora members in Western countries have reported reluctance to approach local law enforcement about harassment by pro-Beijing actors. This reluctance stems from a perception that police might not understand the issue, or that reporting might even backfire (perhaps via leaks or simply no action while the harasser remains active). Human rights organizations have heard victims express that they feel “unsafe in exile” even in countries reputed to be free. This sentiment represents a breach in the bond of trust that should exist between a democracy and those it shelters. In the words of one U.S. congressional report, transnational repression “breaks the bond of trust that must exist” for communities to fully cooperate with authorities. If a person believes the long arm of a foreign dictator can reach them in a democracy and that the democratic government cannot stop it, they may question the very promise of democracy. This can lead to disengagement (e.g., not bothering to report threats, not participating in civic activities) or in worse cases, exploitation by the authoritarian regime (which might whisper: “See, your new country doesn’t care about you, you should comply with us instead”).

Additionally, transnational repression breeds mistrust within diaspora communities, which can spill over into broader societal fractures. Authoritarian regimes often rely on members of the diaspora to act as informants or enforcers, sometimes by coercion, sometimes by incentives. This creates suspicion among exiles: any one of their compatriots could be a spy or someone who would report their activities back home. Research on Syrian and Iranian diasporas, for example, found that people self-censor not just due to fear of the regime per se, but fear that a fellow exile is monitoring them. This erodes the solidarity that these communities might otherwise have. Instead of uniting around shared democratic values or joint advocacy, they may fragment into cliques of trust. Newcomers may be viewed with skepticism until proven not to be regime plants. Such division is exactly what authoritarian rulers seek—to “propagate fear, mistrust, and division between co-nationals”, thereby preventing any cohesive opposition abroad. Unfortunately, this tactic works: it weakens diaspora civil society, whether that’s an association of exiles or even informal networks of mutual support. And when diaspora communities are internally mistrustful, their integration into the host society can suffer; they may become more insular or less politically active beyond their own circles, reducing their contribution to the democratic polity.

The broader democratic public can also develop mistrust toward diaspora communities due to the specter of foreign interference. One example is the growing concern in some countries about Chinese government influence operations, which at times has led to suspicion of Chinese diaspora organizations or even ordinary Chinese students. While vigilance against interference is warranted, there is a fine line where legitimate concern can turn into generalized mistrust or xenophobia. Authoritarian states sometimes deliberately blur this line by using diaspora members as proxies, thus putting those communities in the crossfire of international tensions. Democratic coherence is challenged if significant segments of society begin to eye each other with suspicion—as either potential foreign agents or as groups not fully protected by the state. The ideal of a democracy where all citizens are equal and in it together can be shaken by fears that “some of us are tools of a foreign power” or conversely that “others of us won’t be defended by our government.”

High-profile incidents of transnational repression can also strain national unity and foreign policy consensus within democracies. Consider the domestic aftermath in countries like the UK after the Skripal poisoning, or in the US after cases of covert Chinese police operations were exposed. There can be public outcry and demands for strong action, while other voices caution about diplomatic fallout. These debates are healthy, but if mismanaged, they can create polarization: e.g., some communities might accuse the government of being too lenient on an authoritarian country due to economic ties, while others accuse critics of jeopardizing important relationships. In extreme cases, political partisanship could align with positions on how to handle such foreign interference, leading to democratic incoherence in responding to a common threat. A democracy that cannot present a united front against violations of its sovereignty is showing internal cracks.

Civic trust is also undermined when national security and community safety concerns intersect poorly. If, for instance, a government heightens surveillance of a diaspora community because it fears foreign spies among them, this can backfire by eroding that community’s trust in the government. Finding the balance is tricky: democratic authorities need to protect against foreign espionage and protect the diaspora from foreign repression. Failure in either direction either leaves people vulnerable or makes them feel unjustly targeted by their adoptive country. Some Chinese diaspora activists have voiced frustration that Western authorities are slower to crack down on harassment by pro-CCP elements than on other security threats, arguably because it’s seen as “political” rather than criminal. Conversely, some in Muslim diasporas felt over-policed post-9/11 due to counterterrorism measures, which complicated trust. Transnational repression adds another layer: a democracy must reassure vulnerable exiles that they are protected, while carefully neutralizing any infiltration. Getting this wrong undermines trust from one side or the other.

Finally, the presence of transnational repression can lead to alienation and disengagement of diaspora from democratic life, which is a loss to democratic society. If an exiled journalist stops writing, a refugee dissident stops attending protests or community meetings, or a student from an authoritarian country avoids political discussions on campus—all due to fear of their home regime—then the democracy is deprived of their full participation and perspective. Over time, this can create pockets of disaffected or isolated groups within the democracy, which is detrimental to social cohesion. Democracies are strongest when they incorporate and empower diverse voices, including those who have fled tyranny and can enrich the discourse with their experiences.

Rebuilding and maintaining civic trust in the face of transnational repression is a daunting task, but some steps are evident. Public recognition by democratic leaders that transnational repression is real and unacceptable is a starting point. This validates the experiences of affected communities and shows solidarity. Providing clear channels for reporting and addressing incidents (for example, specialized hotlines or liaison officers in law enforcement for vulnerable communities) can improve trust that the state is responsive. Outreach and education within diaspora communities about their rights and available protections can empower individuals to assert themselves and feel less alone. Conversely, educating the general public about the threat can prevent misunderstanding and build support for measures that defend targets (such as sanctions on foreign perpetrators or increased security around exile community events).

Internationally, democracies coming together to condemn and punish transnational repression (for instance through coordinated sanctions or public attributions of blame) can reinforce to their own citizens that “we have your back if you’re threatened by your former government.” When multiple countries act together, it also reduces the fear that any single host country will be isolated or over-exposed by standing up to an authoritarian bully. This collective stance can bolster community confidence.

Importantly, strengthening social bonds within diaspora communities and between diaspora and other groups is a proactive way to counter the divisive aims of transnational repression. Civil society initiatives, such as mentorship programs pairing exiles with local activists or community dialogues including diaspora and non-diaspora neighbors, can knit connections that make it harder for fear to fester. If an exile knows their local police officer by name and that officer has been sensitized to their situation, trust improves. If members of the public hear directly from exiles about what they escaped and now face, empathy and mutual trust can grow, undercutting any potential stigma of being seen as a “security risk.”

In essence, transnational repression attempts to “divide and intimidate”, whereas democratic coherence is maintained by “unifying and reassuring”. The erosion of civic trust and coherence is perhaps less immediately visible than a murder or a hacking incident, but it is the long-term damage that authoritarian interference seeks to inflict on democratic societies. The ultimate goal of many repressive regimes is not only to silence one dissident, but to send a message to all dissidents (and indeed to the democratic host society) that opposing them even from afar is futile and risky. Countering that narrative is crucial: democracies must demonstrate through action that they can protect the vulnerable, punish the guilty, and remain united in their values. By doing so, they shore up the confidence of all their citizens—native-born or immigrant—that democracy will prevail over fear.

Conclusion

Transnational repression constitutes a profound challenge to democracies in the 21st century. As this article has detailed, the practice of authoritarian regimes extending their coercive reach into foreign democratic states is not an isolated human rights problem—it is a systematic, low-intensity assault on the sovereignty, legal order, and institutional integrity of those states. Analyzing the issue across five dimensions reveals the multifaceted erosion that occurs:

• Territorial sovereignty and law enforcement authority are undermined when foreign agents carry out operations on democratic soil, violating the host state’s monopoly on force and often evading local justice. Incidents from clandestine police stations to assassinations exemplify how authoritarians flout the foundational norm of non-intervention.

• Legal accountability and the rule of law suffer as perpetrators frequently enjoy impunity and authoritarian states exploit legal mechanisms for illegitimate ends. Each coerced rendition or abused INTERPOL notice “undermine[s] the rule of law in host countries” by circumventing due process. Democracies struggle to adapt their legal systems to a threat that ignores the traditional constraints of jurisdiction and sovereignty.

• The integrity of democratic public space is compromised by the chilling effects on speech, assembly, and privacy. Through surveillance, intimidation, and proxy harassment, regimes impose censorship beyond their borders, silencing exiles who should be able to speak freely. This importation of fear corrodes the open dialogue and civic participation that democracies cherish.

• Institutional logics are distorted when democratic agencies and norms are manipulated to serve authoritarian interests. Policy laundering—such as twisting extradition or asylum processes to punish dissidents—means institutions risk betraying their mandates. Tolerating or normalizing foreign interference further blurs the lines, allowing illiberal practices to penetrate governance and setting dangerous precedents.

• Civic trust and democratic coherence are eroded as communities targeted by transnational repression lose faith in their host government’s protection, and societies grapple with mistrust sown by foreign infiltration. The resultant fear and suspicion “propagate… division” within the body politic, undermining the mutual trust and unity essential for a healthy democracy.

Critically, these dimensions are interconnected and mutually reinforcing. When an assassination on a democracy’s soil goes unpunished (sovereignty violated, rule of law thwarted), it sends a message of fear to others (chilling public space) and potentially emboldens further interference (normalizing future breaches), while victims and communities lose trust in authorities. Left unchecked, transnational repression could incrementally hollow out democratic sovereignty from within—state by state, case by case—without ever mounting a traditional military attack or coup. It is, as analysts have noted, a “pernicious and pervasive threat” to freedom that operates in the shadows.

Yet, recognizing this threat is the first step toward countering it. In recent years, democratic states and international bodies have started to respond. The fact that the U.N. Secretary-General, the Council of Europe, the European Parliament, and other multilateral actors have all raised alarms about transnational repression shows a growing awareness that this is a global challenge to the democratic order. In 2023, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe explicitly labeled transnational repression as a “growing threat to the rule of law and human rights”, urging member states to take coordinated action in defense of those targeted. A coalition of civil society groups and democracies at the U.S.-organized Summit for Democracy issued a Declaration of Principles affirming that “transnational repression is a threat to democracy and human rights worldwide” and committing to joint efforts to confront it.

Effective responses are beginning to take shape, informed by the very analyses discussed in this article. To reclaim territorial sovereignty, some democracies have stepped up law enforcement counter-intelligence operations, breaking up foreign spy rings and prosecuting agents of repression. To shore up the rule of law, new legislation (like the TRAP Act in the US and Magnitsky-style sanctions regimes in multiple countries) has been adopted to penalize those who misuse international tools or perpetrate extraterritorial harm. Measures to restore the integrity of public space include granting asylum or other protection more readily to threatened dissidents, improving digital security for activists, and expelling diplomatic staff found engaging in intimidation. Re-establishing institutional clarity involves training officials across agencies about transnational repression, tightening procedures around extraditions and INTERPOL requests, and refusing to acquiesce to authoritarian demands that conflict with democratic values. And to rebuild civic trust, governments are increasing outreach to vulnerable communities, as well as transparently calling out foreign offenders to reassure the public that such acts will not be swept under the rugfreedom.

Ultimately, defending against transnational repression is about democracies reinforcing their own principles. It requires vigilance and a willingness to cooperate internationally, since the threat itself is transnational. The normative stance must be clear: no country’s sovereignty includes the right to violate the rights of people in another country. When authoritarian states attempt to do so, it is not just an expatriate community’s problem, but a breach of the democratic nation’s peace and an affront to its institutional order. In this sense, countering transnational repression is part of the broader project of protecting democracy in an era of resurgent authoritarianism. By holding perpetrators accountable and fortifying resilience, democracies can turn back this low-intensity intrusion. As Freedom House argues, ending impunity and increasing costs for transnational repression will ultimately “strengthen the foundations of democracy” both in host countries and globally.

In conclusion, transnational repression represents a new front in the struggle between authoritarianism and democracy—one fought not on battlefields but in courtrooms, city streets, community centers, and cyberspace. Its slow corrosion of sovereignty and institutions can be halted and reversed, but only with conscious effort and principled resolve. Democratic states must ensure that those who have sought refuge within their borders indeed find the freedom and safety that was promised. Doing so will reaffirm not only the security of targeted individuals, but the integrity of the democratic state itself, preserving trust in the social contract and coherence in the democratic community. The threat is global and persistent, but so too is the commitment of democracies to uphold the rule of law, human rights, and the sanctity of their institutions against all who would undermine them—even from afar.

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