【短片】Only Form Holds - What is Love According to Aquinas？
連結
Youtube影片連結 - youtu.be/ut8VfTYqh6k
Youtube頻道 - www.youtube.com/chan...
Youtube影片
全部內容
（為免翻錯某些字詞原文也被包括在內）
Love is an inescapable part of our lives, so it is probably something we should understand, or at least try to.
Luckily, St Thomas Aquinas offers one of history's most structured, beautiful and comprehensive systems for understanding love.
His account goes beyond asking how relationships work.
Instead, he asks what makes anything lovable in the first place,
how the human person responds to what is good,
why love unites people,
why different relationships have different forms,
how love relates to virtue and justice,
and how all rightly ordered love ultimately leads to God.
This video will attempt to explain Aquinas' answers to all those questions,
and it is presented in a way that hopefully anyone can understand.
You don't need to be a theologian or an expert in metaphysics to get something from what follows.
So, settle down, listen to this while you're doing your chores, or just before you go to sleep.
I hope this helps understand one of the most confusing and incredible things us humans have to deal with.
愛是生活中不可或缺的一部分，因此我們可能應該理解它，或者至少嘗試去理解。幸運的是，聖托馬斯·阿奎那提供了一種歷史上最系統、最美妙且最全面的愛情理解體系。他的闡述超越了對人際關係運作方式的探討。相反，他探究的是什麼使得任何事物都具有吸引力，以及人類如何迴應美好事物（愛是生活中不可或缺的一部分，因此我們可能應該理解它，或者至少嘗試去理解。幸運的是，聖托馬斯·阿奎那提供了一種歷史上最系統、最美妙且最全面的愛情理解體系。他的闡述超越了對人際關係運作方式的探討。相反，他探究的是什麼使得任何事物都具有吸引力，以及人類如何迴應）。他還會探討：為什麼愛能夠團結人們，為什麼不同型別的人際關係有不同的形式，以及愛與美德和正義的關係（為什麼愛能夠團結人們，為什麼不同型別的人際關係有不同的形式，以及愛與美德和正義的關係）。
本影片將嘗試解釋阿奎那對所有這些問題的解答，並且以一種希望任何人都能夠理解的方式呈現。您不需要是神學家或形而上學專家，就能從中獲得一些東西。所以，放鬆身心，在做家務時或者睡前收聽這段內容。我希望這能幫助您理解人類面臨的最令人困惑和最不可思議的事情之一。
First, let's cover what makes something lovable.
For Aquinas, love begins with goodness.
In his view, whatever exists is good in some way simply because it exists and is the kind of thing it is meant to be.
A healthy oak tree is good as an oak.
A sharp knife is good as a knife.
A human being is good insofar as he or she is fully and rightly human.
This is why things can be lovable in the first place.
We're drawn to what is good.
But a good cannot move an appetite unless that good is somehow apprehended.
That means we have to know something as good before we can be drawn toward it.
And that's why Aquinas says that the apprehension or awareness of something as good is what causes love.
We don't love what is completely unknown to us.
The intellectual senses apprehend something and the appetite responds to what has been apprehended as good.
This also explains why something bad can be loved.
Evil itself isn't lovable as evil.
A person who loves something sinful loves some apparent good found in it, such as pleasure, money or status.
The problem is that the thing loved is not a genuine good in the respect in which it is being pursued.
首先，讓我們探討一下是什麼使得事物具有吸引力。對於阿奎那來說，愛始於美好（goodness）。在他看來，任何存在的事物在某種程度上都是好的，僅僅因為它們存在，並且是其應有的樣子。一棵健康的橡樹作為橡樹而言是好的。一把鋒利的刀作為刀而言是好的。一個人類之所以好，是因為他或她完全且正確地展現了人類的本質。這就是事物能夠具有吸引力的原因。我們會被美好所吸引。但是，美好本身無法影響人的渴求（appetite），除非這種美好被某種方式感知到。這意味著，在我們可以被某事物所吸引之前，我們必須知道它是一種美好的事物。因此，阿奎那認為，對某事物作為美好事物的認知或意識是導致愛的根本原因。我們不會愛那些完全陌生的事物。感官會感知到某種事物，而人的渴求則會對被感知到的美好事物做出反應。這也能解釋為什麼有些壞事會被人所喜愛。邪惡本身並不可愛。一個愛上某些罪惡的人，實際上是愛了其中一些顯現的美好之處，例如快樂、金錢或地位。問題在於，被愛的事物並非在它被追求的方面是一種真正的美好。
So the basic structure is very precise.
Goodness is what makes something lovable.
Knowledge presents that good to the appetite.
Love is the appetite's response to the good apprehended as suitable.
But what is love itself?
Aquinas' definition is crucial to understand.
He says that love isn't, first of all, the effect to get something.
It is the appetite's deep yes.
A resting satisfaction or fittingness when it encounters something it recognises as genuinely good for it or suited to it.
Think of that sense of rightness or that all is well you feel when you see a dear friend after a long absence
or the simple contentment of a thirsty person who finally sees clean water.
That initial "this fits, this is good" is love.
Only afterwards does desire follow.
For example, a mother sees her sleeping child and feels a settled gladness that the child simply exists and is hers.
That is the basic act of love.
The desire to protect the child or the joy of holding the child come after that.
That is why Aquinas distinguishes love from desire.
If we encounter something good, our appetite can first be inclined toward it.
That is love.
But if the good is absent and we want to obtain it, desire follows.
If we possess the good and rest in it, delight follows.
因此，基本的結構非常精確。美好是事物具有吸引力的原因。知識將這種美好呈現給人的渴求。愛是人對被感知到的合適之物的渴求的迴應。但是，什麼是愛本身呢？理解阿奎那的定義至關重要。他說，首先，愛並不是爲了獲得某事而產生的效果。而是人的渴求發出的深切肯定的迴應。當它遇到某種事物時，會產生一種平靜的滿足感或契合感，因為它認識到這種事物對它來說是真正美好或合適的。想想當你與一位久未見面的親密朋友重逢時，所感受到的那種正確的感覺或一切都好的感覺；或者一個口渴的人終於看到乾淨的水時，所感受到的簡單滿足感。這種最初的「這很合適，這很好」就是愛。只有之後才會產生渴望（desire）。例如，一位母親看到她熟睡的孩子，會感到一種平靜的喜悅，因為孩子僅僅是存在並且屬於她。這就是愛的基本形式。想要保護孩子或享受抱著孩子的快樂，都是在愛的基礎上產生的。因此，阿奎那區分了愛和渴求。當我們遇到某種美好的事物時，我們的渴求可能會首先傾向於它。那就是愛。但是，如果這種美好不存在，而我們想要獲得它，那麼就會產生渴望。如果我們擁有這種美好並從中得到滿足，那麼就會產生喜悅（delight）。
Aquinas therefore gives love priority in the order of appetite.
Love precedes desire and desire precedes delight.
This is important because love isn't fundamentally a decision to pursue something, nor is it fundamentally an emotion.
It is an act or passion of appetite depending on which appetite is involved.
Human beings have a sensitive appetite through which we experience passions and emotions.
We have a rational appetite which Aquinas calls the will.
Love can therefore exist in different ways.
When love arises in the part of us that feels and reacts emotionally, which is what Aquinas calls the sensitive appetite,
it is a passion, a spontaneous surge of affection, attraction or warmth.
When love belongs to the will, which is the rational appetite, it is the chosen orientation of the person towards someone's good.
阿奎那因此將愛置於渴求的優先地位。愛先於渴求，而渴求先於快樂。這一點很重要，因為愛並非從根本上是一種追求某事物的決定，也不是一種情感。它是由渴求所產生的行為或激情，具體取決於涉及哪種渴求。人類擁有通過感官體驗激情和情緒的敏感渴求。我們還擁有理性的渴求，阿奎那稱之為意志。因此，愛可以以不同的方式存在。當愛出現在我們感受和情感反應的部分時，也就是阿奎那所說的敏感渴求，它是一種激情，一種自發的喜愛（affection）、吸引或溫暖的感覺。當愛屬於意志（即理性的渴求）時，它是個人對某人善的自覺傾向。
Now this can be deliberate, but it can also become so habitual that a person simply acts for the beloved's good without stopping to think it through every time.
For example, you can feel a sudden rush of affection when your spouse walks through the door.
That would be love through the sensitive appetite.
You can also decide on a day when you feel nothing warm to speak kindly and to carry out a difficult promise for their sake.
That's love through the rational appetite, or love in the will.
Both are real forms of love for Aquinas.
The second can remain steady even when the first fluctuates.
The person wills the good that reason apprehends.
This distinction is important because an act of the will doesn't necessarily mean that someone has stopped to make a conscious decision.
Deliberate choice is one operation of the will, but the will can also act from an established disposition.
Someone who's developed a stable love for someone else can act for that person's good without having to consider it from the beginning every time.
Aquinas' account therefore leaves room for spontaneous affection while also explaining deliberate love and faithful action.
這可以是出於深思熟慮，但也可以變得如此習慣化，以至於一個人只是爲了心愛的人而行動，而無需每次都仔細思考。例如，當你配偶走進房間時，你可能會感到一陣突然的喜愛（affection）之情。那將是通過敏感渴求所產生的愛。你也可以在某一天，即使沒有感受到任何溫暖，仍然決定要善待對方，併爲了對方著想而履行一個艱難的承諾。那是通過理性渴求，或者說通過意志所產生的愛。對於阿奎那來說，這兩種都是真實存在的愛的形式。第二種可以保持穩定，即使第一種發生波動。這個人會追求理智所認識到的善。這個區分很重要，因為意志的行為並不一定意味著某人已經停止思考並做出有意識的決定。有意識的選擇是意志的一種運作方式，但意志也可以從既定的傾向中進行行動。對於那些已經發展出對他人穩定之愛的個體來說，他們可以爲了那個人的福祉而行動，而無需每次都從頭開始考慮。因此，阿奎那的闡述既留下了空間來容納自發的喜愛，也解釋了深思熟慮的愛和忠誠。
Aquinas distinguishes love of desire from love of friendship.
I'll leave out the Latin terms here because they're kind of difficult to pronounce.
But love of desire occurs when something is loved because it is good for the lover.
For example, we desire food because we perceive it as a good for us.
We desire knowledge because we perceive knowledge as a good for us.
There's nothing inherently wrong with this.
Human beings naturally desire their own good.
The problem arises when a lesser good is treated as though it were the highest good,
or when something that is not genuinely good is pursued as though it were.
Love of friendship is different.
Here the beloved is loved for the beloved's sake.
The lover wills good to the beloved.
This is why Aquinas says that a friend is someone to whom we wish good.
Friendship can also involve usefulness or pleasure.
Aquinas follows Aristotle in recognising that people can be friends because they benefit one another or because they enjoy one another's company.
But the fullest form of natural friendship is based on the good of the person loved
rather than treating the person just as a means to serve our own advantage.
Love of friendship therefore contains something fundamental to human relationships.
The beloved's good becomes something the lover wills for the beloved.
阿奎那區分了渴求之愛和友誼之愛。我在這裡省略拉丁語術語，因為它們比較難發音。渴求之愛是指當某事物被喜愛是因為它對愛者有益時。例如，我們渴望食物，因為我們認為食物對我們有益。我們渴望知識，因為我們認為知識對我們有益。這本身並沒有什麼問題。人類天生渴望自己的利益。問題在於，當一種次要的善被視為最高的善時，或者當追求某種並非真正好的事物時。友誼之愛是不同的。在這種情況下，是被愛者因為其自身而被喜愛。愛人希望被愛者獲得幸福。這就是為什麼阿奎那說，朋友是指我們希望對方好的人。友誼也可以涉及互助或快樂。阿奎那遵循亞里士多德的觀點，認為人們可以成為朋友，因為他們互相幫助，或者因為他們享受彼此的陪伴。但最完善的自然友誼是基於對被愛者的善，而不是僅僅將對方視為實現自身利益的手段。因此，友誼之愛包含著人際關係中的一個基本要素。被愛者的善成為愛者所希望為被愛者爭取的東西。
Now you may be wondering why love unites people.
Aquinas says that union is an effect of love.
Love adapts the appetite to the beloved.
Because the beloved is apprehended as suitable, the lover becomes inclined toward union with the beloved.
This union can exist even when the beloved is physically absent.
Someone can love a person who's far away because the beloved remains present in the lover through knowledge and affection.
The beloved comes to live inside the lover through knowledge and affection and the lover is drawn out of narrow self-concern toward the beloved.
Aquinas calls this mutual indwelling.
He also says love produces a kind of ecstasy.
Not in the modern sense of rapture or raving at 3am on a Sunday morning,
but in the literal sense of being drawn outside oneself toward what one loves.
For example, a father lying awake worrying about his daughter's exam the next day is already experiencing this.
She is present to him even though she is asleep in another room and his attention has moved beyond his own comfort.
Love draws a person beyond exclusive concern with him or herself toward what they love.
現在你可能想知道為什麼愛能使人們團結在一起。托馬斯·阿奎那認為，合一是愛的結果。愛會調整人的渴求，使其與所愛之人相適應。因為被愛的人被認為是合適的，所以愛人就會傾向於與被愛的人建立聯繫。這種聯繫即使在被愛的人身體不在身邊時也能存在。人們可以愛一個遠在他鄉的人，因為被愛的人通過知識和情感仍然存在於愛人的心中。被愛的人通過知識和情感活在愛人的心中，而愛人則會從狹隘的自我關注中轉移到對被愛的人身上。阿奎那稱之為相互留內（mutual indwelling）。他還說，愛會產生一種「狂喜」（ecstasy）。這裡的「狂喜」並非指現代意義上的欣喜若狂或凌晨三點週日早晨的瘋狂行為，而是指在字面意義上，被愛的人會將自己從自身中拉出來，轉向所愛的事物。例如，一位父親整夜失眠，擔心第二天女兒的考試，他已經體驗到了這種「狂喜」。即使他的女兒睡在另一個房間，但他仍然關注著她，並且他的注意力已經超越了自己的舒適區。愛會將一個人從對自身專屬的關注中拉出來，轉向所愛的事物。
This is another reason why love changes a person's practical life.
Once someone genuinely loves another person, what happens to that person becomes relevant to his or her own actions.
And love is not isolated from action.
Aquinas even goes as far to say that everything an agent does is done from love in a very broad sense
because every agent acts for an end that it desires as a good.
He's not saying that every action is caused by an emotional feeling of love.
He's actually speaking of love in the broad sense of an appetite's orientation toward a good.
This is an important distinction to make because a person can act deliberately for the sake of a good without feeling any accompanying emotion.
A parent can care for a child when exhausted.
A person can remain faithful when affection is temporarily weak.
Someone can endure hardship for justice.
The action can proceed from a rationally ordered love even when a pleasant emotion isn't felt.
Love can also become established through habit.
A person can acquire stable dispositions that make good action easier and more natural.
Someone who's repeatedly acted justly can become just.
Someone who has developed a stable disposition to care for another can act from that disposition without beginning the reasoning process again each time.
But Aquinas doesn't identify every stable action with virtue.
A passion isn't automatically a virtue because it lasts a long time.
Acquired moral virtues are stable perfections of the powers that dispose a person to act well.
Charity is different again because it is an infused theological virtue given by God.
This distinction becomes essential once Aquinas turns from natural human love to charity.
這是愛改變一個人實際生活方式的另一個原因。一旦某人真誠地愛另一個人，那麼那個人的遭遇就會與他或她的行為相關聯。而且，愛並不孤立於行動。阿奎那甚至認為，一個人的所有行為都是出於一種廣義上的愛，因為每個行為者都爲了追求自己所認為的善而行動。他並不是說每一個行為都是由情感上的愛引起的。他實際上是在以廣義上指愛的概念，即渴求對善的傾向。這是一個重要的區別，因為一個人可以在沒有任何伴隨情感的情況下，有意識地為實現某種善而行動。父母可以在疲憊時照顧孩子。人們可以在感情暫時減弱時保持忠誠。人們可以忍受苦難來追求正義。即使沒有感受到愉快的情緒，行動也可以源於一種理性的愛。愛也可以通過習慣而建立。一個人可以通過反覆的行動，獲得穩定的傾向，使良好的行為更容易和更自然。一個反覆行善的人可以變得公正。一個已經培養出穩定關懷他人的傾向的人，可以在沒有每次都重新開始思考的情況下，從這種傾向出發進行行動。但是，阿奎那並沒有將每一個穩定的行為與美德等同起來。一種情感僅僅因為持續了很長時間，就不能自動成為美德。習得的道德美德是使人能夠良好地行動的潛力的穩定完善。仁愛不同，它是一種由上帝賦予的神學美德。一旦阿奎那從自然的人類之愛轉向仁愛，這個區別就變得至關重要。
So how does love relate to friendship and the good of the friend?
Well, Aquinas' account of friendship is much deeper than just liking someone.
A friend is someone whose good is willed for their own sake.
Genuine friendship therefore seeks the friend's real good.
This also explains why love can require correction.
If a friend is doing something harmful, simply approving of whatever they do would not necessarily be love.
Aquinas treats fraternal correction as an act of charity because correcting another person can be directed toward their good.
Love therefore doesn't mean giving a thumbs up to everything the beloved does.
It means willing the beloved's genuine good, which isn't always that.
那麼，愛與友誼以及朋友的幸福之間有什麼關係呢？好吧，阿奎那對友誼的闡述遠不止於喜歡某人。朋友是指那些爲了對方自身的緣故而希望其獲得幸福的人。真正的友誼因此會追求朋友的真正幸福。這也解釋了為什麼愛有時需要糾正。如果一個朋友正在做有害的事情，僅僅贊同他們所做的一切並不一定意味著愛。阿奎那將兄弟般的勸誡視為仁愛的行為，因為糾正他人可以爲了他們的福祉而進行。因此，愛並不意味著對被愛的人所做的一切都表示肯定。這意味著希望被愛的人獲得真正的幸福，而這並不總是如此。
Aquinas gives love an objective order.
The order begins with God, who is the highest good and the final end of human life.
God therefore receives the highest love.
Next comes oneself because each person naturally seeks his or her own good.
In charity that good is ultimately found in God.
So a person loves himself or herself rightly by seeking his or her own beatitude in God.
After oneself comes one's neighbour, with different people occupying different places according to the relationships and goods that unite them.
Parents, children, spouses, relatives, friends and fellow citizens therefore have particular claims on our love because of the particular bonds between us.
So Aquinas' order of love is God first, then oneself in relation to God, then one's neighbours according to the closeness and nature of the relationships involved.
Charity extends to everyone, while the order of charity gives different people different claims upon us.
托馬斯·阿奎那認為，愛具有客觀的秩序。這個秩序始於上帝，他是至善之源，也是人類生命最終的目的。因此，上帝應得到最高的愛。其次是自身，因為每個人天生追求自身的利益。然而，在慈善精神下，這種利益最終都指向上帝。所以，一個人可以通過在上帝那裡尋求自己的幸福來實現正確的自我愛。在自我之後是鄰居，不同的人根據他們之間的關係和共同的利益，在愛的秩序中佔據不同的位置。因此，父母、子女、配偶、親屬、朋友和公民等，由於彼此之間特殊的聯繫，對我們的愛具有特別的要求。阿奎那的愛的秩序是：首先是上帝，然後是與上帝相關聯的自我，再然後是根據關係密切程度和性質來劃分的鄰居。慈善普惠所有人，而慈善的秩序賦予不同的人不同的愛意。
Within that order there are further distinctions.
For example, a child has a particular bond to his parents.
Parents have a particular bond to their children.
Husband and wife have a particular bond through marriage.
Fellow citizens share the bond of political community.
Now these relationships give rise to different obligations and different forms of love.
The order concerns love and obligation while the human dignity of each person remains grounded in human nature.
Every human being is therefore a proper object of charity, including strangers and enemies.
The order also follows the good being pursued.
The same person can have a different claim according to the good at stake.
A parent has a particular responsibility for the welfare of his child.
A citizen has a particular responsibility towards the common good of his political community.
And a friend has particular obligations arising from friendship.
So love therefore has a structure.
We love according to the order of goodness, the order of our relationships, and the order of our final end with God at the summit.
在這個秩序中，還存在更細緻的區分。例如，孩子對父母有特殊的喜愛。父母對子女也有特殊的喜愛。夫妻之間通過婚姻建立特殊的聯繫。公民之間共享政治共同體的紐帶。這些關係會產生不同的義務和愛的形式。這個秩序關乎愛與義務，同時每個人的尊嚴都根植於人類的本性。因此，每個人都是慈善的對象，包括陌生人和敵人。這個秩序也遵循所追求的善。同一個人可以根據所涉及的利益而擁有不同的要求。父母對孩子的福祉負有特殊的責任。公民對政治共同體的公共利益負有特殊的責任。朋友之間則產生特定的義務，源於友誼。因此，愛具有結構性。我們按照善良的秩序、關係的秩序以及與上帝為頂峰的最終目的來表達愛。
Now just now we touched on love of oneself here, which may appear surprising.
But Aquinas doesn't regard self-love as inherently selfish.
A person naturally loves himself and should will his own genuine good.
In fact, the command to love one's neighbour as oneself presupposes a proper love of oneself.
In charity this love is ordered toward God who is the highest good and our ultimate end.
We therefore love God more than ourselves while loving ourselves according to the good we actually are.
This means willing what truly perfects us rather than treating every desire or interest as equally worth pursuing.
A person may therefore rightly sacrifice a lesser personal good for a greater one.
Giving up wealth for justice, comfort for truth, or even life for God doesn't mean that these goods have stopped being good.
It just means that they're being loved according to their proper place in the hierarchy.
Where Aquinas' account becomes distinctly Christian is when he talks about natural love and charity.
剛才我們提到了這裡的自我之愛，這可能會讓人感到驚訝。但阿奎那並不認為自愛是必然自私的。一個人自然地愛自己，並且應該追求他/她真正的利益。事實上，「愛人如己」的誡命預設了正確的自愛。在慈善精神下，這種愛被引導向上帝，他是至善之源和我們最終的目的。因此，我們比愛自己更愛上帝，同時根據我們實際所擁有的善來愛自己。這意味著追求真正完善我們的事物，而不是將每個渴求或興趣都視為同等重要的。一個人可以爲了更大的利益而犧牲較小的個人利益。放棄財富以追求正義、放棄舒適以追求真理，甚至爲了上帝而獻出生命，並不意味著這些利益不再是好的。而是因為它們正在根據其在等級中的適當位置而被愛。阿奎那的觀點之所以具有鮮明的基督教色彩，是在於他談論自然之愛和慈善時。
We already possess natural inclinations towards our own good, towards those connected to us, and towards the goods proper to human nature.
But charity takes these natural loves and perfects and orders them towards God.
Charity is a gift that God pours into our will, creating a real friendship with himself and enabling us to love others in relation to him.
Aquinas calls it an infused virtue by which we are united to God as friends and love other things in relation to him.
We can see this by comparing charity with natural friendship.
In natural friendship, two people enjoy each other's company and will each other's good.
Through charity, though, this same love is elevated into friendship with God, sharing in his life and happiness, and extending that love to others in relation to him.
This is why Aquinas calls charity the greatest of the virtues and the form of the virtues.
我們已經擁有了對自身、與我們相關的人以及符合人類本性的善的自然傾向。但慈善將這些自然之愛完善並引導向上帝。慈善是上帝賜予我們的禮物，它在我們的意志中創造了一種真正的友誼，使我們能夠以與他相關的方式去愛他人。阿奎那稱之為一種注入的美德，通過這種美德，我們將自己與上帝聯繫起來，成為朋友，並以與他相關的方式去愛其他事物。我們可以通過將慈善與自然友誼進行比較來理解這一點。在自然友誼中，兩個人享受彼此的陪伴，並且希望對方的幸福。然而，通過慈善，這種愛被提升爲與上帝的友誼，分享他的生命和快樂，並將這種愛擴充套件到以與他相關的方式去愛他人。這就是為什麼阿奎那稱慈善是最大的美德，也是所有美德的形式。
But charity doesn't stop with God either.
Since charity is friendship with God, it extends to those who can share in the happiness that comes from God.
This gives Christian love its particular structure.
Our neighbour is loved in relation to God, not as though every created person were identical in relationship or obligation, which keeps the order of charity intact.
This is also why Aquinas can distinguish the inward act of charity from every outward act that might express it.
You can be obliged to love someone without being obliged to give that person everything they want.
但慈善並非僅止於上帝。因為慈善是與上帝的友誼，所以它延伸到那些能夠分享來自上帝的快樂的人。這賦予了基督教愛其獨特的結構。我們對鄰居的愛是建立在與上帝的關係之上的，而不是認為所有受造物都具有相同的關係或義務，這樣才能保持慈善的秩序。這也是為什麼托馬斯·阿奎那可以區分慈善內在的行為和任何可能表達它的外在行為。你可能被要求去愛某人，但這並不意味著你必須滿足這個人的一切需求。
Aquinas' treatment of enemies follows directly from this structure too.
We're required to love our enemies, because they remain human beings capable of sharing in the good that charity ultimately seeks.
But loving an enemy doesn't mean having exactly the same affection for him as for a friend.
Nor does it mean pretending that his wrongdoing is good.
Aquinas says that we must love enemies inwardly, while particular outward signs of friendship aren't always required toward each individual enemy.
This distinction is essential.
You can will an enemy's genuine good while still opposing his wrongdoing.
You can seek justice against him.
You can refuse to trust him where trust would be imprudent.
You can support punishment where punishment is just.
None of these things is contrary to charity simply because charity loves the person, because charity does not require love of evil.
阿奎那對敵人的處理也直接源於這種結構。我們有義務愛我們的敵人，因為他們仍然是能夠分享最終所追求的善的人類。但愛一個敵人並不意味著對他抱有與對待朋友完全相同的感情。也不意味著假裝他的錯誤行為是好的。阿奎那說，我們必須內在地愛敵人，而對每個具體的敵人來說，並非總是需要表現出友誼的外在跡象。這種區分至關重要。你可以在反對敵人的錯誤行為的同時，仍然希望他真正得到幸福。你可以尋求對他進行公正的對待。你可以在明知不信任他是不明智的情況下，拒絕信任他。你可以在必要時支援對其進行公正的懲罰。這些都不是與慈善相悖的行為，因為慈善愛的是這個人本身，而不是愛邪惡。
The exact same order appears in forgiveness.
Forgiveness begins with charity's desire for the good of the person who has done something wrong,
while justice gives each person what is due, and these goods can work together.
We can forgive a person even if justice still requires punishment.
We can love someone while still taking account of the danger that they pose.
And we can still desire their good while allowing a damaged relationship to remain appropriately limited.
Forgiveness therefore concerns the good of the person, while justice concerns the good that is due.
Charity gives us the desire for the person's good, and justice gives that love a rightly ordered form.
同樣的秩序也體現在寬恕中。寬恕始於慈善對那些做了錯誤事情的人的福祉的渴望，而正義則給予每個人應得的東西，這兩者可以共同作用。即使正義仍然要求懲罰，我們也可以寬恕一個人。我們可以愛某人，同時考慮到他們可能帶來的危險。我們可以在希望他們幸福的同時，允許一段受損的關係保持適當的界限。因此，寬恕關乎個人的福祉，而正義關乎應得的利益。慈善賦予了我們對他人福祉的渴望，而正義則為這種愛賦予了正確的秩序。
Marriage has a particularly important place because Aquinas understands it as a natural human institution,
with its goods and purposes arising from human nature.
In Catholic revelation, for example, marriage is also a sacrament.
Aquinas connects marriage with the generation and upbringing of children,
and with the stable common life of husband and wife.
Marital love therefore has an objective structure rooted in the goods of marriage itself.
Affection belongs naturally within this structure.
It deepens the friendship between husband and wife and helps them pursue together the goods for which marriage exists.
Love within marriage therefore takes its shape from the nature and purpose of the marital union.
婚姻在其中佔據著特別重要的地位，因為阿奎那認為它是一種自然的人類制度，其價值和目的源於人類的天性。例如，在天主教的啟示中，婚姻也是一種聖禮。阿奎那將婚姻與生育和撫養孩子聯繫起來，以及夫妻之間穩定共同的生活。因此，婚姻中的愛具有客觀的結構，根植于婚姻本身所包含的價值。感情自然地存在於這種結構之中。它加深了夫妻之間的友誼，並幫助他們共同追求婚姻存在的價值。因此，婚姻中的愛會根據婚姻結合的本質和目的而形成其形狀。
Lastly, love also extends into political life.
Human beings naturally live together in communities,
and political community has a common good toward which its members can act together.
Aquinas' account of peace is especially important here.
Peace is the tranquility of rightly ordered unity.
It involves concord between people, but concord reaches its proper form
when their desires are united around a genuine good.
People can therefore share peace while disagreeing about lesser matters,
provided they remain united around the more important goods of the community.
Charity strengthens this unity by directing our love toward the good of others and toward the common good.
We can therefore cooperate with others, give up private advantage for a common good,
and remain united even where disagreements remain.
Aquinas also notes that people who have charity need not agree on every intellectual question.
Charity orders our relationships around the goods we share,
while leaving room for legitimate disagreement about other matters.
最後，愛也延伸到政治生活。人類天生就生活在社群中，而政治共同體擁有一個共同的目標，其成員可以為此共同努力。亞奎那對和平的闡述尤其重要。和平是秩序井然、和諧統一的狀態。它涉及人與人之間的和睦，但只有當人們的願望圍繞著真正的善時，這種和睦才能達到其應有的形式。因此，人們可以在一些次要問題上存在分歧，同時仍然可以分享和平，只要他們保持對社群更重要的價值的團結。仁愛通過將我們的愛指向他人的福祉以及共同的利益來加強這種團結。因此，我們可以與他人合作，爲了共同的利益放棄個人私利，即使在存在分歧的情況下，也能保持團結。亞奎那還指出，擁有仁愛的人不必在所有智力問題上達成一致。仁愛規範了我們圍繞著共享價值的關係，同時為其他方面的合理分歧留下了空間。
And so there you have it. Aquinas' account can now be seen as one connected structure.
A thing is good because it possesses being and the perfection proper to it.
We apprehend that good through the intellectual senses and the appetite responds by loving it.
When the good is absent, love gives rise to desire.
When the good is possessed, love gives rise to delight.
Love unites us with what we love and moves us towards action.
When we love another person, this can become friendship through willing that person's good for their own sake.
Our loves therefore follow the goods and relationships involved.
Natural love can be perfected by virtue,
while charity takes the whole order higher by uniting us to God as the ultimate good and final end.
所以，這就是亞奎那的闡述，現在可以被視為一個相互關聯的整體結構。事物之所以是好的，是因為它具有存在和適合其自身的美德。我們通過理智感知這種善，而我們的渴求則會因此產生愛。當善不存在時，愛會產生渴望；當我們擁有善時，愛會產生喜悅。愛將我們與所愛的事物聯繫起來，並促使我們採取行動。當我們愛一個人時，這可以發展成為友誼，因為我們願意為對方的幸福著想。因此，我們的愛遵循著相關的價值和關係。自然之愛可以通過美德得到完善，而仁愛則將整個秩序提升到更高的層次，通過將我們與上帝聯繫起來，使上帝成為最終的善和終極目標。
This is why God stands at the summit of Aquinas' account.
God is the ultimate source of goodness, the cause of our happiness,
and the final end for which human beings exist.
This goes beyond saying he's just the most important object on a long list of things we love.
Charity orders everything else around that end.
This is how we can understand why we should love ourselves rightly,
why a parent has a particular love for a child,
why friendship involves willing the friend's good,
why correction can be an act of love,
why we can love our enemies,
why justice remains necessary,
why peace requires rightly ordered concord,
and why human love reaches its perfection in charity.
這就是為什麼上帝在亞奎那的闡述中佔據最高地位。上帝是善良的終極源泉，是我們幸福的原因，也是人類存在的最終目的。這不僅僅意味著他是我們在眾多喜愛的事物中的最重要的一項。仁愛規範了所有其他事物圍繞著這個目標。這樣我們才能理解為什麼我們應該正確地愛自己，為什麼父母對孩子有一種特殊的愛，為什麼友誼涉及願意為朋友的幸福著想，為什麼糾正可以是一種愛的行為，為什麼我們可以愛我們的敵人，為什麼正義仍然是必要的，為什麼和平需要秩序井然的和睦，以及為什麼人類之愛在仁愛中才能達到其完美。
Love begins in the apprehension of goodness.
It unites us with what is loved,
moves us towards its good,
and shapes our action according to the kind of good being pursued.
In us, love can exist as passion,
as an act of the will,
as part of acquired virtue,
and, at its highest level, as the infused virtue of charity.
Properly ordered, these loves lead toward the ultimate good in which human happiness consists,
which for Aquinas, is God.
愛始於對善的感知。它將我們與所愛的事物聯繫起來，促使我們追求它的美好，並根據所追求的善的型別來塑造我們的行動。在我們身上，愛可以存在為一種情感，作為意志的行為，作為習得的美德的一部分，以及在最高層次上，作為仁愛的內在美德。當這些愛得到正確引導時，它們會指向人類幸福所包含的最終善，而對於亞奎那來說，這個最終善就是上帝。