Transnational Repression: It Is Not Mysterious, But It Is Evil — Part I

Introduction

In an increasingly interconnected world, even exile no longer guarantees safety from state-led persecution. Transnational repression refers to the tactics by which governments extend their coercive reach beyond national borders to silence dissent among diaspora and exile communities (Schenkkan & Linzer, 2021). In contrast to dramatic incidents like the 2018 assassination of journalist Jamal Khashoggi, most transnational repression operates through less visible, low-cost means that afford high plausible deniability to perpetrators. Authoritarian states have embraced these covert methods as a governance technology—a toolkit of practices that are sustainable, scalable, and difficult to directly attribute—enabling them to intimidate and control critics abroad without resorting to overt violence or high-profile scandals. Recent research and documentation by international NGOs and institutions have revealed the global scale of this phenomenon: Freedom House identified at least 608 direct, physical incidents of transnational repression (including assassinations, abductions, unlawful renditions, and assaults) from 2014 to 2021, carried out by 31 origin governments in over 90 host countries (Freedom House, 2021). Beyond these direct attacks lies an even broader array of “everyday” transnational repression tactics—surveillance, harassment, intimidation, and coercion-by-proxy—that often escape public notice (Abramowitz & Schenkkan, 2021).

This article provides a comprehensive analysis of how transnational repression functions as a low-cost, high-deniability, and scalable tool of authoritarian governance. It draws on authoritative English-language sources – including investigative reports by Freedom House, Citizen Lab, Human Rights Watch, the United Nations, and the Council of Europe – to demystify the mechanisms of transnational repression and the concept of perpetrator invisibility. The emphasis is on explaining how repressive tactics are designed to obscure state responsibility (through plausible deniability, administrative and legal outsourcing, digital proxy violence, and diaspora co-optation) and thereby achieve effectiveness without overt state violence. A dedicated section examines gendered dimensions of transnational repression, especially the weaponization of sexuality and shame, based on emerging research (Aljizawi et al., 2024) and UN analyses of gendered disinformation (Khan, 2023). To ground the discussion, the paper presents cross-border case studies – including the December 2025 sexualized disinformation campaign against Hong Kong exiles, Nicaragua’s systematic revocation of dissidents’ citizenship, and documented patterns of harassment of exiled journalists and scholars – illustrating specific mechanisms in practice. These cases are not used to sensationalize, but to concretely illustrate how the mechanisms operate and interact.

Following this introduction, we establish a theoretical grounding for understanding transnational repression in the context of authoritarian regime strategies and diaspora politics. We then propose a taxonomy of mechanisms used in transnational repression, ranging from direct attacks to indirect “long-distance” methods. Next, we examine the perpetrator invisibility infrastructure: the set of practices that hide the state’s hand and enhance deniability – including the use of proxy actors, manipulation of international institutions, digital covertness, and co-opting of diaspora networks. A subsequent section analyzes the gendered strategies that authoritarian actors deploy transnationally, such as sexualized disinformation and gender-based online violence, and how these intersect with societal norms to amplify repression. We then present a comparative analysis of selected cases, demonstrating how different regimes implement these tactics and the resulting harm to individuals and communities. This leads to a discussion of the broader civic harms and democratic erosion caused by transnational repression: how it undermines human rights, chills civic activism, and violates the sovereignty of host democracies. In conclusion, we reflect on how a clearer understanding of these mechanisms can inform normative and policy responses – from strengthening international protections for exiles to holding perpetrator states accountable.

Throughout the article, core terms are defined precisely and the analysis is rooted in evidence from reputable sources, cited in APA style. The tone remains academic and analytical, avoiding emotive or sensational framings unless substantiated by the literature. By illuminating how transnational repression works as a shadowy extension of authoritarian governance, this study aims to contribute to a rigorous, demystified understanding of a pressing global human rights challenge, and to inform strategies for resistance and accountability.

Theoretical Grounding and Literature Review

Conceptualizing Transnational Repression: Transnational repression can be defined as “coercion perpetrated overseas by authoritarian governments against citizens of their own countries” (Abramowitz & Schenkkan, 2021, p. A21). It encompasses a range of tactics through which regimes project power extraterritorially to intimidate, silence, or harm individuals who voice opposition from abroad. While the practice has historical antecedents (e.g. Soviet KGB operations against defectors), its scale and sophistication in the 21st century are unprecedented. Globalization, increased diaspora populations, and digital connectivity have created new incentives and avenues for authoritarians to monitor and control exiles. As political sociologist Dana Moss (2016) observed in her study of Syrian diaspora activism, modern diasporas often continue dissent transnationally – organizing protests, lobbying host governments, and sharing information online – which authoritarian regimes perceive as an extension of the domestic threat. In response, regimes have internationalized their repressive apparatus, giving rise to what Fiona Adamson and Gerasimos Tsourapas (2020) term the “long arm of the state” reaching into foreign territory.

Recent scholarship frames transnational repression as part of a broader repertoire of authoritarian diaspora governance. Tsourapas (2021) argues that autocracies adopt a mix of strategies toward nationals abroad – from co-optation (wielding patriotism or patronage to win support) to coercion (using threats and punishments to deter dissent) – in order to maintain regime stability. When co-optation fails to neutralize outspoken exiles, coercive measures may be employed covertly across borders. Importantly, these measures often rely on coercion-by-proxy, wherein the regime punishes or threatens something the exile cares about (such as their relatives back home) to induce compliance (Adamson & Tsourapas, 2020). Coercion-by-proxy blurs the line between domestic and international repression, leveraging the regime’s control over citizens and institutions at home to influence diaspora behavior abroad.

Nate Schenkkan and Isabel Linzer’s pioneering 2021 report for Freedom House, Out of Sight, Not Out of Reach, provided the first global study of transnational repression, cataloguing incidents and identifying perpetrator states and their tactics. They found that at least 31 countries engage in transnational repression regularly, including not only major powers like China, Russia, Iran, and Saudi Arabia, but also smaller states such as Rwanda, Belarus, and Turkey (Schenkkan & Linzer, 2021). These regimes target a broad profile of victims: political opposition figures, human rights defenders, journalists, academics, former insiders turned critics, ethnic minority activists, and even ordinary citizens who offend the regime (for example, through social media posts or participation in protests abroad). The common thread is that the individuals are perceived as threatening the regime’s control over its narrative or authority, prompting the regime to enforce loyalty or silence dissent beyond its territorial jurisdiction.

A key insight from the literature is that transnational repression is attractive to authoritarians precisely because it can be low-cost and high-deniability. Direct violent actions like assassinations are relatively rare (though highly visible when they occur) because they carry high diplomatic and reputational costs. Instead, as Heathershaw and Cooley (2017) noted in Dictators Without Borders, many regimes prefer subtle instruments that “export fear” without drawing international outrage. This includes surveillance, exiled critics’ family hostage-taking, mobility restrictions, and smear campaigns – all of which can effectively deter activism at a fraction of the cost of an elaborate overseas hit operation. Authoritarian actors exploit the gaps in international law and the differing priorities of host countries: liberal democracies may offer formal asylum to dissidents but often lack legal frameworks to address foreign harassment on their soil (Roberts Lyer & Roche, 2025). This creates a permissive environment in which authoritarian operatives (or their proxies) can operate with impunity, knowing that local authorities might not recognize or prioritize “foreign” intimidation that falls short of obvious violence.

Global Patterns and Trends: Studies by human rights organizations highlight that transnational repression has become a global phenomenon and is growing in scope. Freedom House’s data showed 854 physical incidents of transnational repression between 2014 and 2022, perpetrated by 38 governments in 91 host countries (Freedom House, 2023). Moreover, these numbers likely understate the true prevalence; for every known kidnapping or assault, there are countless unreported threats, spyware infections, or coercive pressures. The U.N. Secretary-General has acknowledged “the long arm of authoritarianism” as a rising challenge, and in 2022 the UN Human Rights Council established a dedicated mechanism (the Group of Human Rights Experts on Nicaragua, GHREN) to investigate one country’s transnational repression (United Nations, 2022). The GHREN’s mandate underscores that such practices are considered serious violations of international human rights law, potentially even crimes against humanity when they are systematic (GHREN, 2025chr.org).

Another trend is the diversification of tactics enabled by digital technology and globalization. Transnational repression now routinely involves digital transnational repression, which Citizen Lab defines as states using digital tools to surveil, intimidate, and silence dissidents abroad. This includes hacking of communications (e.g. deploying spyware like NSO Group’s Pegasus against exiles), online harassment and defamation campaigns, and misinformation attacks. These digital tactics are often combined with traditional methods like surveillance by physical agents or pressure on family members, creating a multilayered threat environment for exiles (Michaelsen & Anstis, 2025). Authoritarian regimes also exploit international institutions and norms to their advantage: for instance, Interpol’s notice system and bilateral extradition treaties intended for fighting crime are subverted to chase political refugees (Weiss, 2021). The result is a “high-deniability” form of persecution – it masquerades as normal law enforcement or organic social backlash, masking its political motivation.

Normative and Legal Context: From a legal standpoint, transnational repression flagrantly violates numerous principles: national sovereignty (through extraterritorial enforcement of domestic laws), human rights (rights to life, liberty, security, free expression, etc.), and refugee protections (non-refoulement and asylum). Yet enforcement mechanisms to hold perpetrator states accountable remain weak. Most international human rights instruments presume that states only directly harm people within their own territory or jurisdiction, whereas here the harm occurs abroad or in a gray zone of responsibility. One emerging response is to explicitly define and criminalize transnational repression in domestic law. The Council of Europe’s Parliamentary Assembly (PACE) in 2022 urged member states to legally define “transnational repression” and close gaps that allow perpetrators to escape justice. For example, the United Kingdom’s National Security Act 2023 introduced new offenses for foreign interference which could cover stalking or harassing exiles on behalf of a foreign power (Roberts Lyer & Roche, 2025). Nonetheless, the literature notes a lag between recognition and effective enforcement – many incidents still “fall through the cracks” of existing legal frameworks (ibid.). The concept of positive obligations is relevant here: under human rights law, host states have a duty to protect individuals on their territory from foreseeable harm, including harm orchestrated by foreign states. However, operationalizing that duty requires awareness and capacity that many states are only beginning to develop.

In sum, the scholarly and policy literature casts transnational repression as a transdisciplinary concern at the intersection of international relations, human rights, technology, and migration. It is increasingly viewed not as a series of isolated incidents, but as a systemic governance strategy of contemporary authoritarianism – one that poses collective challenges to democratic institutions and the rule of law beyond the borders of the offending states. Building on this conceptual foundation, the next section delineates the concrete mechanisms through which transnational repression is carried out, providing a structured “taxonomy” of tactics identified in empirical studies and reports.

Taxonomy of Transnational Repression Mechanisms

Authoritarian states employ a spectrum of mechanisms to target and suppress exiles and diasporas. These mechanisms can be categorized into several overlapping types, ranging from direct physical attacks to indirect forms of pressure. Understanding this taxonomy is crucial for grasping how transnational repression functions as a “low-intensity, high-deniability” campaign that often operates below the threshold of open conflict or obvious atrocity. We detail each category of tactics below, with examples and evidence drawn from documented cases.

1. Direct Attacks

Definition and Forms: Direct attacks are tactics in which agents of the origin state (or those contracted by them) physically reach the targeted individual to inflict harm or force their return. These are the most overt forms of transnational repression and include: assassinations (targeted killings), kidnappings or renditions (abducting an exile to bring them back to the origin country), physical assaults and beatings, and intimidation in person such as stalking or surveillance meant to terrorize the individual. In extreme cases, dissidents have simply disappeared abroad, likely abducted by origin-state operatives (e.g. the case of a Rwandan journalist vanishing in Mozambique, suspected to have been renditioned by Rwandan authorities).

Examples: High-profile instances of direct attacks include the murder of Jamal Khashoggi by Saudi agents in the Saudi consulate in Istanbul in 2018, which gruesomely demonstrated the lengths to which a regime would go to silence a critical voice abroad. Similarly, Iran’s kidnapping of journalist Ruhollah Zam from Iraq in 2019 – luring him out of his French exile and then abducting him for execution in Iran – exemplifies extraterritorial abduction (Abramowitz & Schenkkan, 2021). Russia and its client regimes have repeatedly carried out assassinations of exiles, such as the poisoning of former spy Alexander Litvinenko in London (2006) and the attempted poisoning of defector Sergei Skripal in the UK (2018), as well as shootings of Chechen dissidents in European cities. The government of Rwanda has been implicated in attacks on exiled opposition members in South Africa, including the assassination of former intelligence chief Patrick Karegeya in 2014. And as recently as 2020, Ramzan Kadyrov’s Chechen regime (under Russia’s aegis) saw multiple critics shot in Europe, with at least three Kadyrov opponents killed on European soil in one year.

Characteristics: These direct attacks are high-impact but relatively infrequent due to their diplomatic fallout. They often involve a covert action element – e.g., using undercover hit squads, organized crime collaborators, or clandestine operations – but once revealed, they unambiguously link back to the perpetrator state, causing international condemnation. For that reason, regimes tend to reserve assassinations or renditions for “hardened” targets: prominent dissidents or former insiders seen as especially threatening, or to send an intimidating message to others. Even one or two such incidents can have an outsize chilling effect on diaspora communities: Freedom House notes that “every assassination, every rendition creates a ripple effect in a diaspora community, silencing far more than just the individual targeted” (Abramowitz & Schenkkan, 2021). Exiles who learn of a fellow activist’s abduction or murder may self-censor or cease their activities out of fear.

Responses: Host countries have legal jurisdiction over these violent acts on their soil and have sometimes pursued accountability (for example, German courts prosecuted an agent for a 2019 Berlin assassination of a Chechen exile linked to Russia). However, identification and prosecution of culprits is challenging when state actors invoke diplomatic immunity or use non-attributable proxies. Nonetheless, direct attacks are clearly illegal (violating criminal laws and often international law), and they tend to draw the clearest rebuke from the international community. They represent the “tip of the iceberg” of transnational repression – conspicuous but not the whole picture.

2. Coercion-by-Proxy (Targeting of Family and Associates)

Definition: Coercion-by-proxy is a method whereby regimes punish or threaten relatives, friends, or colleagues of the exiled target, usually those who remain in the home country, to exert pressure on the target. Rather than directly harming the exile, the regime makes their loved ones suffer as proxies. This can involve harassment, surveillance, or detention of family members, public smear campaigns against them, or economic and legal pressures (job loss, asset freezes) on associates. The goal is often to deter the exile from outspoken activism or to compel their return. Coercion-by-proxy also extends to threats delivered remotely – for instance, phoning an exile and threatening to imprison or harm their relatives if they do not comply.

Examples: This tactic is widely documented. A Uyghur activist in Canada described receiving repeated phone calls from Chinese police back in Xinjiang, warning her to stop speaking out or else her family members would be detained. Many Uyghur diaspora members have, in fact, seen relatives in China arrested seemingly as retribution for their advocacy abroad (Amnesty International, 2021). In Iran’s case, families of journalists working for Persian-language media abroad (like BBC Persian) have been interrogated or banned from leaving Iran, to pressure the journalists into quitting or toning down their reporting. Syria under Assad routinely applied “collective punishment” to families of exiled dissidents, seizing their property or jailing siblings and parents. The North Korean regime infamously considers defection a treason of one’s entire family line – relatives of escapees can end up in labor camps.

A recent stark example comes from Nicaragua, where the Ortega regime has targeted relatives of exiles as part of its transnational repression campaign. The U.N. Group of Human Rights Experts on Nicaragua reported in 2025 that relatives remaining in Nicaragua faced harassment, arbitrary detention, dismissal from jobs, confiscation of property, and restrictions on movement “solely by virtue of association” with someone who fled or spoke against the regime. Such family-targeting creates what victims term “dual punishment”: the exile suffers guilt and pressure to protect their family, while the family suffers in order to make an example of the cost of dissent.

Characteristics: Coercion-by-proxy is extremely effective at exploiting emotional ties and cultural obligations. It often forces exiles into painful dilemmas – continue their activism at the risk of family harm, or self-censor to keep loved ones safe. Many exiled activists report that threats to family are more agonizing than threats to themselves. Importantly, coercion-by-proxy is a low-visibility tactic. To the outside world, a sibling’s arrest or a parent’s suddenly revoked passport might not obviously appear connected to the exile’s activities; regimes typically cite unrelated pretexts (e.g., tax charges against a relative). This plausible deniability makes it harder to rally international support in these cases, as they can be portrayed as “internal matters” or legitimate law enforcement.

Interactions with Other Tactics: Coercion-by-proxy often complements digital harassment and surveillance. For example, authoritarian security services may monitor an exile’s social media and communications to identify their networks and then intimidate those contacts or family members. It also works in tandem with mobility controls: by placing loved ones on no-exit lists or confiscating their passports, regimes prevent families from reuniting in safety and thereby keep hostages in place.

3. Digital Threats and Cyber Harassment

Definition: Under this category fall tactics that leverage digital technology to threaten, defame, or intimidate targets remotely. These include hacking and spyware attacks to steal information or surveil the target’s communications, online harassment (abusive messages, death or rape threats on social media), doxing (publishing private personal information to invite abuse), and smear campaigns spreading disinformation about the individual. Digital threats often originate from anonymous or pseudonymous actors online, which can be state agents, state-sponsored “troll armies,” or patriotic volunteers incited by the regime’s rhetoric. What makes these tactics part of transnational repression is the evidence or likelihood of state orchestration behind ostensibly independent online abuse.

Examples: Many exiled dissidents and journalists report sustained online harassment that appears coordinated. For instance, exiled Iranian women journalists have been subjected to intense Twitter campaigns accusing them of moral indecency, accompanied by fake or doctored images, shortly after they publish critical pieces – suggesting a network of pro-regime trolls at work (RSF, 2022). In a concrete case from December 2025, Hong Kong pro-democracy activists in exile (Ted Hui in Australia and Carmen Lau in the UK) were targeted with sexualized disinformation on social media and through postal letters. Hui’s former workplace received emails with a fabricated poster advertising his wife as providing sexual services, while Lau’s neighbors in London received deepfake images depicting her in sexually explicit situations (Needham, 2025). These attacks, believed to be organized by pro-Beijing elements possibly linked to Hong Kong authorities, aimed to humiliate and socially ostracize the activists. As Lau noted, this abuse “uses humiliation as a tool of political punishment and a warning to others” – echoing a long-standing pattern of authoritarian actors deploying sexualized online smears to silence women (Lau, 2025, quoted in Needham).

Another notorious tool is spyware. Cybersecurity investigations have revealed that regimes like Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Mexico, and others deployed sophisticated spyware (e.g. Pegasus) against dissidents abroad, enabling them to turn the targets’ smartphones into surveillance devices. Such spyware can extract emails, record calls, and even activate cameras, granting regimes an intimate window into exiles’ lives and networks. The Citizen Lab uncovered that Saudi operatives targeted the inner circle of Jamal Khashoggi (including an exiled colleague in Canada) with Pegasus prior to Khashoggi’s murder, presumably to monitor their communications. Similarly, the Rwandan government has been accused of using malware to spy on diaspora critics in Europe (Amnesty & Citizen Lab, 2021). These digital intrusions are invisible and non-violent, but they violate privacy and can facilitate further repression (e.g., identifying new targets or blackmail material).

Characteristics: Digital repression is highly scalable. A single state-sponsored troll farm can harass dozens of dissidents simultaneously across different countries, and a spyware campaign can collect intelligence on large groups without the need for physical presence. It is also comparatively low-cost – purchasing hacking tools or hiring trolls is cheaper than international covert ops – and high-deniability – states can claim that online abuse is simply the behavior of private “patriotic” citizens, not official policy. For example, when confronted about coordinated online attacks or hacking incidents, state authorities often deny involvement and point to lack of hard proof linking it to government agencies.

However, research shows clear patterns linking digital harassment to state interests. Freedom House’s 2023 analysis of exiled journalism notes that digital threats like cyberattacks, doxing, and social media harassment are regularly used in tandem with offline intimidation as part of the playbook to silence exiled reporters (Freedom House, 2023). The effects on the targets are profound: journalists under digital assault have difficulty maintaining websites (due to DDoS attacks), fear for the safety of their sources (due to hacking and surveillance), and suffer public character assassination that undermines their credibility.

Digital repression frequently exploits features of online platforms. Authoritarian actors may engage in coordinated inauthentic behavior – running fake accounts en masse to amplify harassment or spread false narratives about exiles (Facebook and Twitter have taken down such networks tied to e.g. China and Iran in recent years). They may also weaponize personal data leaks: for instance, hacked or leaked databases have been used to out refugee activists’ identities or whereabouts, exposing them to danger (Aljizawi, 2024). The use of deepfakes and doctored media, as in the Hong Kong case, is particularly insidious: it adds an element of plausible fiction to smear campaigns, leveraging salacious fake content to inflict reputational harm that is hard to reverse even after debunking.

4. Mobility Controls and Legal Maneuvers

Definition: These tactics involve manipulating the target’s ability to travel, reside safely, or access legal protections. Authoritarian regimes often use bureaucratic and legal levers to constrain exiles’ mobility. Key methods include: passport revocation or non-renewal, citizenship stripping, placing individuals on watchlists or Interpol notices, false criminal charges and extradition requests, entry bans (refusing re-entry to one’s home country or even pressuring third countries to deny entry), and deprivation of consular services (e.g., denying an exile paperwork like birth certificates, thereby complicating their life abroad). These measures stop short of physical harm but can severely disrupt an exile’s life and expose them to further risk.

Examples: Nicaragua provides a stark example of mobility-based repression on a mass scale. In 2023, the Nicaraguan government under Daniel Ortega stripped over 300 political dissidents of their Nicaraguan citizenship in a series of moves unprecedented in scope. In February 2023, 222 political prisoners were released and deported to the United States, immediately rendered stateless as the government revoked their nationality and confiscated their assets, branding them “traitors”. In subsequent months, more activists, journalists, and even clergy were arbitrarily deprived of citizenship – over 450 people by late 2024 – leaving many effectively stateless (Human Rights Watch, 2024). Their names were erased from civil registries (a move victims described as “civil death” because it annihilated their legal personhood). The UN experts’ investigation confirms that Nicaragua also routinely refuses to renew passports or issue identity documents for exiles, and has deleted dissidents’ records from official databases. These actions trap people in legal limbo, impairing their ability to claim asylum elsewhere or even to perform basic functions like opening a bank account or enrolling children in school.

Another common form is the abuse of Interpol’s Red Notice system. Interpol notices are meant to flag fugitives for serious crimes, but states like Russia, China, Turkey, and Tajikistan have notoriously submitted Red Notices for exiled dissidents on spurious charges (e.g. “terrorism” or fraud) purely to cause their detention abroad. For instance, Turkey issued thousands of Interpol notices after the 2016 coup attempt, some targeting journalists or academics abroad (who then had trouble with immigration or even got briefly arrested in places like Spain or Ukraine). A case cited by Freedom House: a Russian businessman who fled to the U.S. was held in U.S. immigration detention for over a year due to a frivolous Red Notice Russia filed against him, which alleged financial crimes as retaliation for his political defection. Such misuse led Interpol to eventually cancel many notices, but by then the damage (detention, legal fees, stress) was done.

Regimes also leverage extradition treaties and mutual legal assistance deceptively. They may file extradition requests for exiles based on trumped-up indictments. A notable series involves Turkey’s pressure on friendly states: dozens of Turkish nationals abroad accused of links to the Gülen movement have been extradited or “rendered” back to Turkey without due process, often bypassing normal legal procedures (Kosovo, Moldova, and some Middle Eastern states were examples where Turkish intelligence spirited suspects away). China similarly has pursued the extradition of Uyghur refugees by accusing them of terrorism in host countries like Thailand and Egypt, sometimes succeeding in having them deported into peril (Amnesty, 2018). Such tactics represent administrative outsourcing of repression: manipulating legal systems of other countries to do the regime’s bidding, giving a cloak of legality to what is essentially persecution.

Characteristics: Mobility controls are attractive to regimes because they immobilize and isolate the target. A dissident who cannot travel freely may be unable to attend conferences, speak at the UN, or join protests, thereby reducing their international impact. If their passport is revoked, they might become undocumented in their host country once their visa expires, subjecting them to possible deportation (essentially forcing host states to collaborate in the repression unless asylum or alternate status is granted). The deniability factor is also high: governments justify these acts through formalistic reasons – “nationality can be revoked under our law for disloyalty” (as Nicaragua argued), or “the individual is wanted for common crimes, we’re just cooperating with law enforcement” (as often claimed with Interpol or extraditions). The administrative veneer makes it harder to immediately categorize these as human rights abuses, although international law does prohibit arbitrary denationalization and bad-faith use of legal instruments.

Impacts: The cumulative impact of mobility-focused repression can be devastating. The Nicaraguan case showed that rendering hundreds of people stateless not only punishes them individually but sends a message to all citizens that opposing the regime means losing all civic belonging. For those in exile, lack of valid documents can impede access to asylum (as many countries require passports for refugee status determination). It also complicates integration – e.g., exiles can’t get driver’s licenses or diplomas recognized without papers. In effect, the regime’s reach creates a class of “political orphans” adrift in the international system. Such measures may not spill blood, but they can break careers, separate families (by making travel impossible), and induce a state of constant insecurity for the targeted individuals.

5. Co-opting Host Institutions and Local Agents

Definition: This category involves a regime leveraging the institutions or citizens of another country to act against the target. Instead of or in addition to sending their own agents, an authoritarian state might manipulate local police, intelligence services, diaspora organizations, or even private actors to surveil, intimidate, or detain the exile. Tactics include: unlawful or pressured deportations (convincing or bribing host officials to expel someone outside legal norms), local proxies and informants (cultivating compatriots or others in the diaspora to spy or harass on the regime’s behalf), and legal harassment in host country courts (e.g., SLAPP lawsuits filed by proxies to burden exiles with legal trouble). Essentially, this is outsourcing repression to third parties, blurring accountability.

Examples: A documented practice is China’s use of diaspora community groups and “United Front” organizations overseas. Chinese embassies and consulates reportedly guide student associations and hometown societies in monitoring Chinese students and activists, organizing counter-protests to drown out dissident events, and reporting on “troublemakers”. In some cases, Chinese students in Western universities have faced orchestrated backlash (like intimidation for supporting Hong Kong protests), with indications that consular officials coordinated these responses. Another example is Iran’s recruitment of local private investigators and criminals for a plot to kidnap Iranian-American activist Masih Alinejad from Brooklyn in 2021 – U.S. prosecutors later charged Iranian intelligence agents who had hired an American private investigator to surveil Alinejad’s home, showing how a regime can subcontract repression abroad (USA v. Farahani et al., 2021).

There have also been multiple incidents of host countries’ authorities colluding with the origin state. For instance, as mentioned earlier, some governments (often authoritarian-leaning or dependent on the perpetrator state) have handed over exiles outside legal procedures. The Freedom House report notes the case of two Turkish individuals apprehended in Ukraine in early 2021 and swiftly sent back to Turkey “without proper deportation proceedings” – an example of host compliance under likely political pressure. Similarly, Egypt in 2019 deported Uyghur students at China’s request, disregarding their asylum claims. Sometimes, even democratic states have been unwittingly complicit: e.g., if local police accept a foreign embassy’s claim that a dissident is a criminal and briefly detain them for questioning, it serves the regime’s aims of intimidation (cases of this have been reported by exiles from Bahrain and Rwanda in the UK, who said they were intermittently questioned or surveilled by people believed to be connected to their embassy).

One striking and subtle method is misuse of financial systems – flagged by the UN experts on Nicaragua: they found evidence that Nicaraguan authorities triggered false “alerts” in financial compliance networks to freeze exiles’ bank accounts abroad. By tagging dissidents as money-launderers or terrorists in international banking databases, a regime can induce banks (in host countries) to close accounts or deny services to those individuals, effectively crippling their economic life without any formal charge. Freedom House similarly recounts how a Turkish journalist in the U.S. lost multiple bank accounts because of unfounded terrorism accusations from Turkey, a result of banks’ over-compliance with risk rules (Freedom House, 2023)freedom. In essence, private corporations become tools of repression via regulatory manipulation.

Characteristics: Co-opting others allows authoritarian regimes to expand their reach at minimal direct exposure. It’s cost-effective – why risk your own agents if sympathetic locals or duped institutions can do the work? It also muddies the waters of responsibility, providing multiple layers of deniability. If confronted, a regime can say, “It was that country’s sovereign decision to deport the individual” or “We have no control over what diaspora volunteers do out of patriotism.” This fragmentation of culpability is a core part of the invisibility infrastructure we discuss in the next section.

However, co-option often leaves traces in patterns. For example, when multiple dissidents of the same origin country are targeted in one host country by ostensibly independent actors, it suggests coordination. New Zealand’s Security Intelligence Service warned in 2025 of exactly this pattern: an increase in incidents where foreign dissidents in NZ “are targeted for harassment within New Zealand by co-opting others” (NZSIS, 2025, as cited in Reuters). The implication is that local authorities need to be vigilant about foreign security services trying to penetrate their territory through intermediaries. Indeed, some countries have begun prosecuting individuals who act as undeclared agents of a foreign power (for instance, the U.S. has charged several Chinese-Americans for stalking or pressuring Chinese dissidents in the U.S. on Beijing’s behalf).

Conclusion of Taxonomy: These categories – direct attacks, coercion-by-proxy, digital threats, mobility controls, and co-option of others – are not mutually exclusive. Authoritarian regimes often deploy them in combination for greater effect. For example, an exile might simultaneously face online harassment (digital threat), find their passport canceled (mobility control), hear that their brother was arrested back home (proxy coercion), and observe unfamiliar individuals following them (direct intimidation) – a multi-pronged assault on their sense of security. The choice of tactics may depend on the regime’s capabilities, the host country’s openness, the profile of the target, and the need for discretion. What unites these disparate methods is their shared function: to extend repressive control across borders, instilling fear and silencing voices without engaging in open inter-state conflict.

Having mapped out the array of mechanisms, we now turn to examining how states keep their role in these abuses hidden or obscured – the mechanisms of perpetrator invisibility that make transnational repression an especially pernicious threat.

The Invisibility Infrastructure: Plausible Deniability and Proxy Methods

A defining feature of contemporary transnational repression is the effort by perpetrator states to remain invisible or unaccountable as the authors of the harassment. Unlike traditional acts of war or overt repression (where the state’s role is direct and public), transnational repression is often characterized by ambiguity over who is behind the threatening act. This section analyzes four key elements of this perpetrator invisibility infrastructure: plausible deniability, administrative and legal outsourcing, digital proxy violence, and diaspora co-optation. These elements are often intertwined and collectively enable regimes to violate rights with minimal repercussions.

Plausible Deniability

Concept: Plausible deniability refers to the ability of a regime to credibly distance itself from a repressive act, casting doubt on whether it ordered or orchestrated it. This is achieved by using cut-outs, covert agents, or methods that mimic non-political or criminal activity. If an assassination looks like a gang murder, or a cyber attack looks like the work of independent hackers, the state perpetrator can deny responsibility and outside observers might be unsure. This uncertainty shields the regime from direct blame or legal accountability.

Use in Transnational Repression: Many cases of physical harm to exiles are shrouded in ambiguity by design. For example, when exiled Chechen dissidents are killed in Europe, the assailants are sometimes hired criminals with no overt tie to the Chechen government, allowing Chechen authorities (and Moscow) to deny involvement even if circumstantial evidence suggests otherwise. The murder of Zelimkhan Khangoshvili (a Georgian-Chechen asylum-seeker shot in Berlin in 2019) was carried out by a Russian citizen later linked to Russian security services. While a German court ultimately pinned responsibility on Russia, at the time Russia simply denied any connection and refused extradition of suspects, leveraging deniability until hard evidence emerged. In another example, consider the harassment of Hong Kong exiles with sexualized deepfakes: these letters and images were circulated anonymously or through untraceable routes (some came via mail from Macau), enabling Hong Kong/Chinese authorities to claim they have “no knowledge” of it. Indeed, when asked, officials did not respond or brushed it off, fitting a pattern where the origin state remains officially silent, neither confirming nor credibly investigating the abuses.

To maintain deniability, states often employ proxies – which can include private contractors (mercenaries, private investigators, hackers), or front organizations. The use of third-party actors creates a buffer. For instance, Iran’s alleged plot to kidnap activist Masih Alinejad in New York involved Iranian intelligence hiring an Iran-based private network, which in turn hired a U.S. private investigator – layers of actors such that Iran’s hand would have remained hidden had the FBI not uncovered the chain. Similarly, countries like the United Arab Emirates have hired U.S. and Israeli private cyber firms to conduct surveillance on dissidents, muddying attribution (some operatives later claimed they thought they were working for a different client).

State Narratives: When incidents come to light, authoritarian governments frequently push counter-narratives: they claim the target is a criminal or terrorist who got caught in legitimate law enforcement, or they insinuate that some other actor (a rival political faction, an extremist group) might be responsible. For example, after the poisoning of ex-spy Sergei Skripal in the UK, Russian officials floated theories of British intelligence staging the attack – a classic propaganda tactic to confuse attribution. This information warfare around incidents is part of preserving deniability in the public sphere.

Limits of Deniability: Plausible deniability sometimes falters when evidence is overwhelming or patterns are too consistent. The gruesome nature of Khashoggi’s assassination made Saudi state responsibility undeniable, despite initial Saudi denials and claims of a “rogue operation.” Likewise, when multiple dissidents from the same country are harmed in similar ways, the pattern erodes the plausibility of coincidence. Yet, even in such cases, authoritarian regimes rarely face proportionate consequences. Powerful states like China or Russia can stonewall investigations, betting on other countries’ reluctance to escalate diplomatic conflicts. In short, plausible deniability is not about fooling everyone indefinitely; it’s about creating enough doubt or bureaucratic complexity to avoid triggering strong, unified retaliation against the perpetrator.

Administrative and Legal Outsourcing

Concept: This refers to regimes using international systems, foreign bureaucracies, or third-country laws to accomplish repression under the guise of normal administrative or legal processes. Rather than acting blatantly outside the law, the regime bends existing laws and institutions to its will, outsourcing the dirty work to the routine operations of international cooperation (like immigration control, law enforcement, or banking).

Mechanisms: A prime example is Interpol Red Notices and diffusions. As discussed earlier, countries have misused Interpol by filing alerts for dissidents as if they were criminals. This effectively delegates the initial arrest and detention to police in the host country that subscribes to Interpol, as happened in the case of the Russian dissident detained in the U.S. on a false notice. Until the notice is recognized as abusive (which can take time and legal effort), the host country’s system treats the individual as a fugitive. Similarly, immigration enforcement can be co-opted: regimes sometimes send notification to a host country that a certain refugee’s passport is “cancelled” or reported stolen, causing that person to be detained at airports or unable to renew visas. Nicaragua’s practice of marking dissidents’ passports as void in international databases has likely led to exiles being stranded or detained in transit.

Another form is leveraging extradition treaties. Autocracies may issue international arrest warrants through bilateral agreements. For instance, Bahrain has tried to extradite exiled dissidents from European countries by accusing them of ordinary crimes. Turkey has, in the past, pressured countries like Kyrgyzstan and Pakistan with mutual pacts to hand over alleged “terrorists” (actually regime critics). Even when these efforts fail in court due to the obvious political nature, the targeted person goes through prolonged legal uncertainty and potential detention during the fight.

Legal harassment can also be outsourced by encouraging proxies to sue or legally charge the exile in a third country. For example, an oligarch allied with an authoritarian regime might file defamation suits in London against an exiled journalist, exploiting plaintiff-friendly libel laws (a form of transnational SLAPP – Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation). The result is the exile must fight costly legal battles in a foreign court, which serves the regime’s goal of distraction and intimidation.

Financial systems provide an administrative vector as noted: by flagging individuals or NGOs as linked to terrorism or extremism, regimes trigger automated compliance responses. Banks or payment platforms will freeze assets or block transactions to avoid risk, effectively cutting off the target from resources. Because these actions come from private entities following international regulations, the persecution is laundered through legitimate frameworks.

Benefits for the Regime: Outsourcing to legal/administrative channels provides a patina of legitimacy. The regime can claim, “We are following the law and international procedures.” It also puts the onus on the victim to prove their persecution, often in foreign courts or before skeptical officials who might initially presume the request is made in good faith. This method tends to be “low-noise”; it doesn’t generate the immediate alarms that a kidnapping or shooting would. A person quietly loses their citizenship or finds their bank account locked – events that might not even make the news, but which accomplish repression by obstructing the individual’s ability to function and advocate.

Challenges: Democratic countries and institutions are increasingly aware of this abuse. Interpol has instituted reforms (like vetting mechanisms) to curb Red Notice abuse, though issues persist. Some countries now have laws to ignore certain extradition requests (e.g., several Western states have stopped honoring extradition to China for Hong Kong dissidents after the National Security Law of 2020 made even speech abroad an offense). Yet, legal and admin outsourcing exploits the principle of international cooperation, which is hard to overhaul without undermining genuine law enforcement collaboration. Thus, authoritarian regimes continue to find cracks they can slip through, taking advantage of bureaucratic inertia and the principle of sovereign equality (other states being reluctant to question the bona fides of a request from a recognized government).

This concludes Part I. Part II examines gendered transnational repression—how authoritarian actors exploit shame, sexuality, and digitally mediated coercion to discredit, isolate, and deter women and LGBTQ+ individuals.
Next: Part II — Gendered Repression and the Weaponization of Shame